Initiatives and Obstacles to Reintegration in Divided Communities:
UNHCR’s Imagine Coexistence Project in Bosnia and Herzegovina

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Editorial note
This invited paper builds on and updates an earlier article which appeared in 2009 in the *International Journal of Transitional Justice*: ‘(Re)Imagining Coexistence: Striving for Sustainable Return, Reintegration and Reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, 3 (1): 91-113. A version of the paper was presented at the Conference on Displacement and Reconciliation, 9-10 June 2011, Saint Paul University, Ottawa.

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Initiatives and Obstacles to Reintegration in Divided Communities: UNHCR’s Imagine Coexistence Project in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Huma Haider

Abstract

Prior to the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats shared neighbourhoods and friendships. The war, through its objective and effect, divided these groups and re-shaped communities and neighbourhoods. The physical return of displaced persons and refugees post-war has been insufficient to renew coexistence and a sense of belonging. The weak economy exacerbates divisions, further hindering return and reconciliation. This article explores the challenges of reintegration and re-establishing a ‘home’ in the context of social divisions and few employment opportunities. It reviews initiatives designed to restore trust and coexistence among ethnic groups and to address basic needs, focusing on the UNHCR’s ‘Imagine Coexistence’ project. It finds that although such initiatives receive limited attention and funding, they have achieved successes in repairing social relationships, addressing poverty and improving lived environments. They should be given greater prominence in BiH and in the design of other peacebuilding interventions.

Key words: Return, Reintegration, Coexistence, Reconciliation, Bosnia and Herzegovina

A very important element of pre-war social life throughout the former Yugoslavia had been the custom of taking time to drink coffee with a friend or colleague…The disappearance of this custom between national groups in post-war [Vukovar and] Mostar is another indicator of disturbed social connections.

- Dinka Corkalo et al. (2004)

My old neighbours are Croats and when we first returned to visit, they approached us and we shook hands and greeted each other. They asked how we were and so on. When we come these days, they only say “Good afternoon.” It isn’t like it used to be before the war. There is no “Come on, let’s have a coffee.” There is nothing like that any more. And when there is nothing like that, I do not feel like going there.

- A Bosniak who fled Mostar during the war describing visits to his former home (in Dinka Corkalo et al.)
When all sides are pulled into a war...they no longer talk, and develop ice walls. They need someone to say, “hey, coffee?”

- Bosnian representative, Danish Refugee Council

Introduction

The displacement of an estimated 2.2 million persons during the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) was not a byproduct of war, but its very purpose. It was part of the policy of ‘ethnic cleansing,’ the term used to describe ‘the elimination by the dominant ethnic group of a given territory of members of other ethnic groups within that territory’ (UN Department of Public Information 1995, 65-66). This was achieved in BiH through a variety of methods, including harassment, beatings, torture, rape, summary executions, forced relocation, confiscation of property and destruction of homes, places of worship and cultural institutions. Ultimately, ninety percent of the pre-war Bosnian-Serb population left the area now called the Federation and over ninety-five percent of the pre-war Bosnian-Croat and Bosniak (Bosnian-Muslim) inhabitants left what is now Republika Srpska (Rosand 1998, 1100).

The Dayton Peace Agreement (“Dayton”), signed in December 1995, put an end to the fighting between Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks and officially divided the country into the two entities – the Bosniak-Croat Federation (“the Federation”; 51% of the territory) and Republika Srpska (RS; 49%). At the same time, Dayton guaranteed to all refugees and displaced persons the right to return. This right extended not only to return to BiH, but to one’s specific pre-war home. Annex 7 of the Agreement stipulates:

I (1) All refugees and displaced persons have the right freely to return to their homes of origin. They shall have the right to have restored to them property of which they were deprived in the course of hostilities since 1991 and to be compensated for any property that cannot be restored to them.

II (1) The Parties undertake to create in their territories the political, economic, and social conditions conducive to the voluntary return and harmonious reintegration of refugees and displaced persons, without preference for any particular group.
Reintegration, which is essential for sustainable return, is defined by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as the ‘universal enjoyment of full political, civil, economic, social and cultural rights’ (UNHCR Geneva 2004, ONE 5).

The UNHCR was responsible for developing and implementing the repatriation plan, in consultation with asylum countries and the Parties to the agreement (the Republic of BiH, the Federation of BiH and the RS). It also worked with other international agencies and local organizations to implement return. This was a tremendous responsibility, as many saw the fulfillment of the ‘right to return’ and the reversal of ‘ethnic cleansing’ as integral to peace (Rosand 1998).

Return was tremendously difficult in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As in all wars, property and infrastructure were damaged, income and savings lost, and fear and hostilities prevalent. However, the situation in BiH was especially complex. Not only were 1.2 million refugees scattered overseas, but approximately 1 million were also displaced internally. Many abandoned houses were occupied by internally displaced Bosnians, whose houses, in turn, were occupied by people displaced from other areas. Property repossession was an extremely complex and politically charged process.

Fifteen years after, more than one million former refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) are reported to have returned to their pre-war homes. These returns include a significant 469,594 minority returns - returns by refugees and IDPs to their pre-war homes in areas in which they are now a minority group. A primary enabler of return was the property repossession process – the ‘Property Law Implementation Process’ (PLIP), which achieved a 93.3 per cent implementation rate by the end of July 2005 (UNHCR 2006).

Property repossession and reconstruction are not sufficient, however, to guarantee sustainable return. Insufficient attention has been paid to efforts that would allow for returnees to properly reintegrate into their pre-war communities, economically and socially. The persistent segregation and distrust between different ethnic groups, rendered ‘enemies’ during the war, hinders reintegration into a multiethnic community. Further, the unemployment rate in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been high throughout the post-war period and hovers at 40 per cent, affecting the entire population. Minorities face the additional problem of discrimination.

Having witnessed first-hand the difficulties in bringing people who had fought bitter wars against each other to live together again, Sadako Ogata, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees from 1990-2000, pushed for a pilot programme, called ‘Imagine Coexistence’ (Ogata 2003). It was comprised of joint activities, designed to rebuild coexistence in ethnically divided communities and to create an opening for later reconciliation work. This initiative and others like
it achieved successes in renewing contact, building trust and repairing social relationships in target communities. Many of them were also connected to an income-generating component, providing smart and innovative examples of how coexistence can be mainstreamed into economic projects and the return process.

Despite the benefits of such initiatives, international and local communities have not given them the attention necessary such that a coherent, coordinated and long-term approach could be adopted in divided communities, throughout the country. More concerted efforts to promote coexistence, livelihoods and community development are essential to promote sustainable return and reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The purpose is this paper is to encourage donors, international agencies, non-governmental organisations and other actors working on aspects of post-war recovery to mainstream coexistence into their work and to think of innovative ways to combine various components of recovery to promote more sustainable return and peacebuilding.

The Return Process in Bosnia and Herzegovina
In the aftermath of the war, many of the same individuals – mayors, city councilors, police, war profiteers – who directed and oversaw ethnic cleansing, remained in power. They were eager to consolidate their war-time gains and maintain ethnic political support by orchestrating the permanent resettlement of displaced populations. As such, minority returns were politically contentious and vehemently blocked by the very authorities tasked with carrying out the restitution process.

Local authorities often mobilized whole communities of displaced persons to violently confront minority returnees. With wounds from the war still festering, individuals and groups felt safe among their own and were open to mobilization by authorities promulgating threats posed by the ‘other.’ They participated in riots against minority returnees and in the destruction of their property.

Minority returnees were also subjected to discrimination. For example, in Derventa municipality, authorities gave land plots to the Serb population free of charge, in a non-transparent manner, without giving a single plot to non-Serbs (Government of Norway et al. 2004). Croat returnees to the area emphasized that funds to rebuild houses were also allocated in a discriminatory fashion.⁴
International Efforts to Promote Minority Return

Amidst intense resistance to minority return, international actors designed and implemented a number of initiatives to promote minority return. The UNHCR's 'Open Cities' project, launched in March 1997, was designed to break down political opposition to minority return by providing economic incentives to municipal authorities. Municipalities that declared themselves 'open' to return, particularly minority return, and committed to the reintegration of returnees, would receive reconstruction aid (Rosand 1998). In 1998, fifteen towns were declared ‘open cities,’ with a target of 50,000 minority returns during the first half of 1998 (Belloni 2005; ICG 1998, 15). However, after ten months, only 580 minorities returned to six ‘open cities’ (ICG 1998a, 53).

Several reasons are offered for this failure. Prominent among these are inadequate transparency and unclear justification for the selection of beneficiary towns; and inadequate monitoring of local progress. In addition, authorities were rewarded based on their promises and stated intentions as opposed to actual results. As such, the willingness of some authorities to be ‘open’ evaporated after they received funds. Further, the project did not address the critical problems of double occupancies and other property rights violations (ICG 1998a). These were subsequently addressed in the Sarajevo Declaration and by the Property Law Implementation Plan.

During the war, abandoned property laws were passed allowing authorities to extinguish the occupancy rights of pre-war property owners in favour of temporary displaced occupiers. Such laws solidified ethnic cleansing. Further, many authorities adopted a strategy after the war of deliberately placing people of their own ethnicity in housing belonging to other ethnic groups to prevent minority returns. The Sarajevo Declaration, an outcome of the high profile return conference held in February 1998 (led by the Office of the High Representative - OHR\(^5\)), laid out key problems and set a timeline for resolution (ICG 1998a). In particular, it set a deadline for the Federation to repeal the war-time property laws, adopt new OHR-approved property legislation, and set procedures to re-instate pre-war occupancy rights. Reconstruction aid was made conditional on the fulfillment of these tasks. The RS received similar pressure.\(^6\) Both entities complied, the Federation in April 1998 and the RS in December 1998.

While progress was gradually being made, there were still pronounced difficulties. Despite new property legislation and increased monitoring, many nationalist local authorities still refused to enforce eviction notices, especially if it meant evicting occupants of their own ethnic group (Bradley 2006). After persistent obstruction, the international community decided, in 1999, to depoliticize the process by shifting the focus away ‘from a collective right to return to an
The individual right to property (Philpott 2006, 45) was achieved through the ‘Property Law Implementation Plan’ (PLIP), with collaboration by the OHR, UNHCR and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). A legal-administrative framework was set up, requiring claims to be dealt with on a neutral ‘first-come, first-served’ basis, in a standardized, transparent and professional manner. It allowed a movement away from ethno-political negotiations centred on specific numbers of returns to specific areas to repossession grounded in rule of law and civil rights (Prettitore 2004).

The impact of this reorientation was tremendous. By December 2003, close to 93% of 216,026 real property restitution claims had been processed. Although eliminating the explicit push for ‘return,’ the PLIP in effect, by breaking the impasse on property repossession, allowed for significant progress in recorded minority returns. Such returns throughout BiH increased from an annual total of 41,007 in 1999 to 102,111 in 2002.7

While recognizing that the PLIP was an important pre-condition for return, critics have argued that it alone does not guarantee sustainable return. Charles Philpott, who was part of the OSCE Mission to BiH from 1999-2002, stressed that the intense focus on property restitution distracted the international community from addressing other problems. UNCHR field staff worked on law implementation instead of issues relating to sustainable return, and OSCE field staff often complained that the restitution focus prevented them from working on employment and social services discrimination. Hopes that completion of the restitution process would free them up to address such issues were frustrated, as both UNHCR and OSCE subsequently closed field offices in areas where full property law implementation has been achieved (Philpott 2005). Such downsizing by the international community has continued. The critical provision in Annex 7, which stipulates that authorities must also create suitable conditions for ‘harmonious reintegration’ of returnees, has been de-emphasized. Reintegration is still elusive, and many of the recorded returns unsustainable (Amnesty International 2006).

The Notion of ‘Home’: The Need for Economic and Social Reintegration

Over one million returns – among which 469,594 are significantly minority returns, and a PLIP implementation rate of 93.3 per cent are remarkable statistics. However, pure statistics hide much of the reality of the restitution process. In some cases, high restitution rates actually corresponded to high rates of sale or exchange instead of return (Philpott 2005). A report by the European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance documents estimates that, in Republika Srpska, only 20 to 30 percent of those to whom property has been returned actually live there (ECRI 2005, 14). In addition, the properties of minorities choosing not to return are
usually purchased by someone of the locally dominant ethnic group, effectively cementing ethnic cleansing by means of the post-war housing market (Ó Tuathail and Dahlman 2004).

Even where houses are not sold, official return statistics do not tell the full story. The Housing Verification and Monitoring Unit of the OHR/RRTF (established in 1999) found that while about three-quarters of pre-war occupants return to their reconstructed houses, only a part of the family actually returns in a third of those cases. Elderly family members return permanently, whereas younger people and school-age children remain in areas in which they are a majority for employment and education (ICG 2002). Return is thus often in reality a matter of degree. Stef Jansen (2010a) finds that many Bosniak minority returnee concentrations have been to villages just across the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL). These returnees in addition to others further into the RS straddle the IEBL and remain connected to the Federation for employment, education, health care, shopping and other activities. This degree of return allows renewed attachment and investment in pre-war residences without having to fully experience the challenges of living as a minority. Even today, Jansen finds that only a proportion of reported minority Bosniak returnees live permanently in the RS.

A related trend is “reverse returns.” Walter Kälin, Representative of the Secretary-General on the human rights of internally displaced persons, highlighted that the number of persons actually living in their pre-war homes is lower than return statistics suggest; a large number of returnees have left again due to poor conditions (Kälin 2005). The UNHCR confirmed this more recently, stating that many returnees have not stayed in their place of return permanently, primarily due to a lack of economic opportunities there. In addition, people are situating themselves in communities of their own ethnic group (UNHCR 2007).

These patterns of selling property, incomplete or reverse returns result in the feeling by many Bosnians of ‘being suspended in time and space’, considered ‘one of the worst problems associated with displacement’ (Jansen 2010a, 148). They result from the reality that ‘home’ as remembered by refugees and displaced persons no longer exists. This is due not only to the profound changes wreaked by the war, but in the case of BiH, also due to the insufficient attention and resources given to factors that would allow for reintegration and help to sustain a ‘home’. Actors involved in the return process have equated ‘home’ with property (Jansen 2007). This has neglected the notion of ‘home’ as not only a physical place of residence, but also a site of social and cultural relations and a place that provides well-being, opportunities and hope for the current and next generation (Jansen 2006; Stefansson 2006). More specifically, the notion of ‘home’ extends to the ability to earn a livelihood and of children to have a good education. It includes the existence of a network of support, and in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina in
particular, the ability to rely on neighbours and the custom of coffee visits to each other’s homes (Helms 2010; Stefansson 2010). A local return activist emphasised the importance of such visits and cultural values of hospitality to relations in local neighbourhoods:

That’s our tradition to live in a neighbourhood [where] you have someone to go visit for coffee, that she comes to your house for coffee, that you help her out when she’s working in the garden and then afterwards you sit and have coffee. […] That’s the kind of neighbourhood I want to live in, not just living side by side (Helms 2010, 25).

What many Bosnians returned to was far from their recollection of ‘home’. Old neighbours had disappeared. Hostilities, mistrust and residual fear within reshaped communities were widespread. Residents stayed inside their houses and locked their doors. Employment and income-generating opportunities were sparse, poverty rampant and discrimination against minority returnees prevalent.

Return in post-conflict societies requires overcoming negative past experiences and re-encountering people with whom relationships were broken (Rodicio 2001). While reconciliation has been defined in various ways, it refers broadly to the process of overcoming hostility and mistrust between divided peoples (‘social repair and reintegration’) and developing a common understanding of the causes and nature of the conflict and developing shared notions of responsibility (‘facing the past’) (see Rodicio 2001, 131). It is still today the lack of employment and income-generation opportunities and persistent division and segregation between groups that are hindering reintegration, sustainable return and movement toward reconciliation.

Lack of Income and Employment

Bosnia and Herzegovina is a country that is still transitioning not only from a conflict, but from communism to a market economy. These are both tremendously difficult transitions on their own; compounded by rampant corruption and minimal investment - the economy is weak.

In late 2004, official data reported a 42 per cent unemployment rate, with people under 30 the most affected (Fischer 2006a, 234). In 2005, the unemployment rate reached 60 per cent in many rural areas (U.S. Department of State in IDMC 2006, 12). A United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report on social exclusion stated that about 50 per cent of the population of both entities in BiH live below the poverty line or are at risk of falling below it at any time. It also stressed that minority populations throughout the country are usually poorer (UNDP 2007, 76).
While the weak economy is a problem for the entire population, the minimal employment opportunities is especially grave for minority returnees because of widespread ethnic discrimination in both public and private sector employment (Amnesty International 2006; ECRI 1005; Government of Norway et al. 2004).

The absence of jobs and employment discrimination renews and exacerbates divisions. They are mutually reinforcing, impeding reintegration, reconciliation and sustainable return. A staff member of the rule of law department in the OHR stated for example that 'rape victims will relive their suffering more prominently than [other rape victims] with jobs, who are contributing to their family and to society.' This makes it more difficult to reconcile with the perpetrator and with people of the perpetrator’s ethnic group.

Dire employment conditions can precipitate comfort with one’s own ethnic group and negative views toward the other, even in the absence of war crimes and human rights violations. An OSCE Advisor noted that if there is unemployment and lack of resources, and people are preoccupied with how to survive financially, they will ‘tend to stay with their community and be more reluctant to open up and foster coexistence.’ Others noted that when people have jobs and start working together, politicians will be unable to prey on their discontent and nationalism becomes less of a focus. Reconciliation becomes more possible. Case studies on return in Drvar and Foča reveal that economic insecurity in both towns has contributed to tensions between majority and minority communities. Economic grievances have come to be defined in ethnic terms (Donais 2005; Čukur et al. 2005).

On a more practical level, the pre-occupation with immediate economic needs has resulted in a lack of interest in and prioritisation given to addressing societal divisions. A Bosnian human rights advocate insisted, 'It’s not that you just build houses and people will automatically reconcile; but it is that they cannot reconcile if they are hungry.' Anders Stefansson’s informants from his study on the town of Banja Luka, the capital of Republika Srpska explained:

As long as their everyday lives were characterized by problems of poverty, unemployment, and lack of permanent housing, reconciliation remained too abstract and somehow unimportant an issue for them to start taking a serious interest in it (Stefansson 2010, 68).

A large number of informants surveyed as part of the evaluation of Sida’s Integrated-Area Programmes also argued that an improvement in the economic situation is a precondition
for coexistence (Čukur et al. 2005). Further, a recent study conducted on inter-ethnic friendships in BiH found that people who were better off economically and who were optimistic about the economic future of their region were more likely to have friends of different ethnicities and to want to develop further friendships across the divide (O’Loughlin 2010).

**Damaged Social and Community Relations**

While employment and income-generation are considered key enablers for reintegration, coexistence and eventual reconciliation, they do not – on their own – automatically result in reconciliation. While it may be possible for ethnic divisions to become less prevalent with greater economic opportunities, additional interventions are needed that directly address social cohesion and reconciliation (Oxford Research International 2007). As the founder of a Czech non-governmental organization (NGO) operating in BiH stressed, ‘Economic prosperity of a country doesn’t guarantee smooth coexistence of various ethnic groups, cultures and religions.’ Especially when they have been torn apart by violent war and ethnic cleansing.

Prior to the war, Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats shared neighbourhoods and friendships. Many also shared families, as intermarriages had been common. But the orchestrators of the war had other designs and ambitions. The war, through its objective and effect – divided these communities and groups.

Divisions were fostered and manipulated through fear and ‘dehumanization’ of the ‘other.’ States of terror and collective fear were created through indiscriminate violence that penetrated all levels of society, pitting communities against communities, neighbours against neighbours and friends against friends (Fletcher and Weinstein 2002; Pouligny et al. 2007; Stover and Weinstein 2004). Feelings of betrayal were and continue to be prevalent. An aid worker spoke of the sense of betrayal that his Bosnian-Croat wife still feels over her closest Serb friends having left during the war without giving her any notice. Even though they all live in Sarajevo now, she finds it difficult to be friends again. Feelings of betrayal by those left behind are a serious impediment to the process of social repair, especially when those departing had knowledge of an impending assault on the town or village and said nothing (Corkalo et al. 2004).

Feelings of betrayal, distrust of the ‘other’, hostility and fear can become part of the collective psyche and resistant to change. Failure to acknowledge and address the psychological and social effects of communal violence is a significant obstacle to the
development of peaceful relations and reconciliation (Bar-Tal and Bennink 2004; Colletta and Cullen 2000; Halpern and Weinstein 2004a). Reconciliation is a long-term process requiring a restoration of trust, empathy (recognition of shared suffering), and rehumanization of the ‘other.’ Rehumanization, through personal contact and dialogue, helps to dispel fear – a key driver of ethnic division (Rogan 2000).

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, physical reconstruction has occurred much faster than social repair. Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks continue to harbour deep resentments and residual fear toward each other. Surveys conducted in towns in BiH demonstrate the persistence of high levels of suspicion about the ‘other’ groups (Biro et al. 2004). Distrust of members of the other group have been demonstrated in some cases by enactment of social sanctions, whereby neighbours and former friends are no longer welcome for coffee visits as they were before the war (Helms 2010).

The persistence of ethnic divisions has hindered reintegration of minority returnees and rendered national minorities one of the most distinctly socially excluded groups. Self-exclusion and alienation from inter-ethnic social networks also exists (UNDP 2007). In municipalities, which have had significant minority return, segregation within communities has prevented meaningful interaction across the ethnic divide that would help rehumanize each group in the eyes of the other (Herman 2005).

Bukovača is a Croat-Bosniak town in the Federation that remains divided. The Programme Manager of a local women’s organization described the situation as complete division: Bosniaks are not able to work in Croat companies, children go to school in shifts, restaurants and social venues are separate, and even streets are divided.

Divided education is a problem that persists throughout the country. In some cases, the same school building is used by two ethnic groups but in a completely segregated manner, referred to as ‘two schools under one roof.’ Students, teachers and staff of different ethnicities attend the same school, but in different shifts or use separate entrances and occupy separate sections of the same building (Global IDP Database 2005). There are 54 such schools in the Federation, as reported by the OSCE, in which Bosniak and Croat students are taught different curricula in divided classrooms (Sivac-Bryant 2008). In other cases, schools are segregated with different buildings. Other schools are segregated by location, which has resulted in costly and inconvenient bussing of children such that they can attend a school in their majority area; or children stay in the area of displacement.
The divided education system has been a strong deterrent to return. Parents fear their minority children will face discrimination and learn exclusively the curriculum, language, culture and specific version of history of the majority group. In Prijedor, a Bosniak returnee remarked that Bosniak children are still learning a Serb curriculum in school, despite agreement by officials to move toward a common core curriculum. There are also concerns that minority children would have to attend schools that teach negative stereotypes of their ethnic group (Torsti 2009).

In addition to impeding return, divided schooling fosters ‘mental barriers’ and hatred and prevents reconciliation among future generations (Torsti 2007, 90-91; IDMC 2006). Despite efforts to delete offensive references in textbooks and the apportioning of blame for aggression and war crimes to the ‘other,’ young people are still learning different interpretations of the past - with glorification of one’s own group and demonization of the ‘other.’ This, some worry is ‘planting the seed for another war.’

Another key problem with the segregated school system is that young people are not exposed to the ‘other,’ compounding the similar lack of exposure outside of school. In the absence of positive experiences with people of other groups, it is difficult to overcome prejudices and stereotypes (Minow 2003). The Director of the Catholic School in Centar Sarajevo stresses the importance of mixing children of all nationalities in classrooms, which is done at this school, and learning about the religion of their neighbour: ‘Here in Bosnia, hate is borne from not knowing one another’ (ICG 1998b, 18).

Prior to the war, neighbours in BiH interacted regularly with the ‘other’ - sharing in each other’s cultural and religious holidays and festivities. In stark contrast, during the war, religious places of worship and monuments were deliberately destroyed as part of the campaign for ‘ethnic cleansing’ – to eliminate all signs of a community’s existence (Ó Tuathail and Dahlman 2005). As such, rebuilding religious sites has been an important part of reconciliation. It has also contributed to return.

Still, there have been incidents of further destruction and violence reported over the years, directed against all sides. The UNHCR reported a periodical increase in security incidents directed toward returnees in 2005, compared to 2004, many of which seemed to be connected to either national or religious holidays not welcomed by the ‘other’ ethnicity (e.g. Orthodox Easter in May and Bajram in October) (UNHCR BiH 2005). In order to minimize physical insecurity, a UNHCR Officer explained, ‘If you are a minority, you don’t make it too
obvious.’ You don’t make a big deal about religious holidays because it would be politicized beyond the meaning of it and considered a provocation.”

A more recent report by the U.S. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor documents continued ethnically-motivated religious violence in various municipalities, directed at ethnic symbols, clerics, and religious objects and buildings. These included the destruction of tombstones in Muslim and Catholic graveyards, the attempted burning of a Serb Orthodox church near Srebrenica, and theft from a Catholic church. The illegal construction of religious buildings, for example a Serb Orthodox church built on private Bosniak-owned land, have also been divisive. The report states: ‘In these cases the buildings or monuments were built to send a political message to minority believers about the dominance of the majority group in that area, creating ethnic tensions and impeding the process of reconciliation’ (U.S. Department of State 2008).

While a great deal of progress has been made in Bosnia and Herzegovina since Dayton, the country remains unstable. Tremendous efforts are still needed to ensure that return is sustainable and Bosnians are able to fully reintegrate into their pre-war communities. Initiatives that advance both income generation and coexistence can contribute to achieving this goal.

**Initiatives targeting Income-Generation, Community Development, Coexistence and Reconciliation**

Economic opportunities and market activity can be instrumental in reestablishing contact among groups and providing avenues for cooperation. Just after the signing of the Dayton Agreement, a black market – called the ‘Arizona Market’ – emerged spontaneously on the inter-entity border between Doboj and Tuzla, selling building and home improvement materials. It attracted traders and shoppers of all ethnic groups, in need of income and goods to improve their families’ lives. General Charles Boyd emphasized that this market offers a clue to rebuilding a multiethnic society in BiH. Economic opportunity can force re-exposure to and interaction with the ‘other’ and rebuild confidence among different groups in living together (Boyd 1998; see also Divjak 2006). The International Crisis Group remarked as well that this black market did more for reconciliation than the politicians (ICG 1997, 61). The international community recognized this peacebuilding opportunity, viewing the market as a ‘neutral space’ for interaction and as an engine of economic growth. In 2000, the OHR legalized all trading activities and the market was gradually privatized. Now managed by an Italian company, the market employs around 5,000 people and continues to attract Bosnians of all ethnic backgrounds.
Still, the private sector in Bosnia remains underdeveloped. Its weak institutions and complicated regulations have deterred investors (Divjak 2006). It will be quite some time before the private sector can be relied upon on its own to create income-generating opportunities and ‘neutral spaces’ for interaction, necessary for sustainable return. Moreover, it is not desirable for complex processes of reconciliation to be left to the private sector. As such, donor interventions in these areas are still imperative.

Given the power of economic opportunities to induce contact and collaboration among differing groups, it is possible and beneficial to design programmes that foster not only economic reintegration but also coexistence.

**Economic Reintegration Initiatives**

Associations that are responsive to local needs and to interests that are not ethnically defined have the potential to attract the involvement of various groups and to better influence societal conditions (Pickering 2006; Pickering 2007). Intergroup relations can be strengthened by improvements in the local economy, which can diminish the importance of interethnic competition or rivalries decline (Afzali and Colleton 2003). They can also be strengthened as a by-product of associations attracting people of different backgrounds and of working together on concrete tasks. For example, the United Methodist Committee on Relief (UMCOR) provided dairy cows and lacto freezers to the villages of Sevarlije and Pridjel Gornji and facilitated the formation of an Association of Milk Producers. This allowed for milk producers to act as a group and develop a joint market access strategy. The association, together with a dairy, established milk collection and storage stations. This increased the production of milk and the income into the community, encouraging further collaboration. This venture also contributed to improved contact and relations between ethnic groups as the association was comprised of both Croat and Bosniak returnees, and the owner of the dairy was Serb. Without the intervention of UMCOR and the development of the association and negotiation with the dairy, such collaboration between the ethnic groups may not have occurred.  

In addition, UMCOR sought to explicitly incorporate a coexistence dimension. It required that grants be repaid in the form of an in-kind donation of products or services to the community. Such innovative forms of financing can help to rebuild confidence among neighbours as they assist each other, create room for dialogue and renew trust.

Similar findings arise from the Srebrenica Milk Road Project, in which farmers organised themselves into producer groups. The main achievement of the project was a marked increase in efficiency and profitability of milk production. Beyond this, new informal ties between Bosniak
and Serb farmers have also been established and the development of reciprocity and trust: ‘through their involvement in the project, many of the beneficiaries also began to share equipment, help each other out, share information and soon became friends’ (UNDP 2009, 98).

The UNDP, under its Support to Results-based Approach – Partnership for Local Development (SUTRA-PLOD) project, has explicitly shifted from a pure returnee focus to one that addresses whole communities. Funds have been directed toward group assistance instead of individual assistance, assessing the exact needs of a community and conducting market analysis. This maximizes inputs on the ground. A UNDP Officer stressed though that the ideas have to come from the community:

They have to sit together, organize themselves and come up with something solid that we can support … It helps with capacity building and building friendship by working together – being part of a group.25

These programmes have made a tremendous difference for returnees, many of whom have since become self-sufficient, and are increasingly benefiting communities as a whole (ICG 2000). This in turn can reduce resistance to minority return; and foster cooperation across ethnic groups.

Unfortunately, international donors have been reluctant, as a general strategy, to fund programmes that support livelihoods (ICG 2002; ICG 2000). There have been limited interventions that go beyond physical return and subsistence to address the socio-economic sustainability of returnee communities (Donais 2005). The Bosnian Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees also decided, despite the persistent unemployment problems, to continue the focus primarily on housing construction.26

Insufficient attention to economic issues has had detrimental effects not only for livelihoods but also for coexistence, especially given the strong potential of employment and income-generation initiatives to bring people together. A study on return and displacement in Banja Luka found that shared economic interests contributed to some degree of peaceful socialising between Bosniaks and Serbs, including joint agricultural activities:

Sometimes this practical interdependence resulted in coffee visits to each other’s homes. […] Working together or drinking coffee together was not necessarily an expression of love or deep friendship, but it was at least a sign of the acknowledgement of local sharedness, the need for social exchange and, to a certain extent, mutual hospitality (Stefansson 2010, 68-69).
An in-depth study on social capital in BiH by Paula Pickering, a former Human Rights Officer in Bosnia, found that workplace environments were effective in supporting positive interethnic relationships. These environments address practical needs and create neutral opportunities for repeated, mutually dependent interethnic interaction (Pickering 2006 and 2007). Recognition of interdependency in turn is critical to the development of reconciliatory attitudes (Abu-Nimer 2001). The study stresses that people without regular work missed not only an income but also an important source of social integration (Pickering 2006 and 2007). Similarly, many social reintegration initiatives, focused primarily on fostering coexistence and reconciliation, have sought to incorporate an economic element – to address needs of returnees and to encourage efforts by all parties to coexist.

**Social Reintegration Initiatives**

‘Coexistence’ is a significant aspect of the reconciliation process (Kriesberg 2001). As discussed, reconciliation involves both the process of rebuilding trust and relationships and facing the past. Social reintegration initiatives have focused more on the former, seeking to reestablish coexistence through reengaging and reframing the ‘other,’ fostering cross-ethnic dialogue and (re)building relationships.

One of the ways re-exposure to the ‘other’ and confidence-building was facilitated was through the UNHCR’s inter-entity bus line. Considered one of the organization’s most successful projects, many of the various bus routes initially implemented by the Danish Refugee Council were commercialized – given their immense popularity. Bus routes were established to most return areas and greatly improved freedom of movement between and within the two Dayton-created entities. Potential returnees were able to engage in ‘go and see’ visits, gather more information on their pre-war home, and gain exposure to the ‘other’ as a ‘normal’ person. Buses were usually full to capacity and multi-ethnic riders often very emotional, which demonstrated that there were many in the country opposed to the nationalist agenda of ethnic segregation (ICG 1997).

A Danish Refugee Council representative provided an example on a smaller scale – whereby he set up a minibus to travel three times a week from Mostar to the RS to allow displaced Bosnians to repair their homes in their pre-war communities. He said, ‘All of sudden … People of different ethnic groups were forced to sit in the same bus.’ Gradually contacts were created and ‘small networks of favours,’ as people began to ask one another to send messages or bring packages to family and friends who lived near various passengers. With more dialogue came empathy, as Bosnians started to realize that they were all suffering.27
Fostering such dialogue and interaction with the ‘other’ is especially important for young people in Bosnia, who have grown up in a climate of intolerance and rigid stereotypes (Englbrecht 2001). To counter ongoing segregation of the educational system, USAID agreed to engage in initiatives to rebuild destroyed schools only if classes are integrated. In Gubavica (Federation), where fierce fighting occurred during the war between Bosniaks and Croats, and from where Bosniaks and Serbs were expelled by the Croat army, USAID worked with the deputy mayor of Mostar’s southern municipality to reconstruct the elementary school. USAID agreed to the project only after receiving assurances that Bosniaks and Serbs would return and the school would be multiethnic. On 15 November 1999, the school opened and triggered significant cooperation among teachers and students, representing each of the three ethnic groups, and among parents and the community as a whole. Special attention has been given to ensure that the curriculum covers all sides.28

Ipak, a Bosnian NGO, has also supported the integration of young returnees. With funding from Swiss and German sponsors, it has developed a youth centre within eastern Bosnia, an area to which many young displaced persons returned. There were minimal social and economic outlets in the region. The centre benefits both Bosniak returnees and young Bosnian Serbs and is designed to promote social integration and peaceful inter-ethnic relations. It organises leisure activities, education programmes, vocational training and production, including the formation of cooperatives and links to employment opportunities at local and regional firms (Fischer 2006b). An evaluation of the centre indicates that the various joint activities were successful in enabling youth across ethnic lines to identify shared interests and concerns, and to work toward achieving shared objectives. Such cooperation, in turn, facilitated long-term friendships (Fischer and Fischer 2004).

UNHCR also attempted to promote tolerance and reconciliatory attitudes among school children across the country, as part of its efforts to create a safe and secure environment for sustainable return. Supported by the Federation and RS Education Ministries, it launched a nation-wide contest – ‘Together’ – on 16 May 2000, which called for students to submit an essay, artwork, song or poem, demonstrating their thoughts on how to learn, play and live together with students of all ethnicities (UNHCR 2000).

This was part of an overall drive by the UNHCR post-Dayton, led by then High Commissioner Sadako Ogata, to integrate a coexistence dimension into its repatriation activities in order to make return durable and to prepare the grounds for later reconciliation work (UNHCR 2003a). The biggest outcome of this was ‘Imagine Coexistence,’ a pilot project implemented in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Rwanda.
Imagine Coexistence
Given the acute problems the UNHCR faced with return in Bosnia and Herzegovina, every effort was needed to fight hostilities that had grown real from the war. ‘Imagine Coexistence,’ launched by the UNHCR in January 2001, was comprised of joint activities for members of different ethnic groups with a view to overcoming deeply entrenched mistrust, promoting cooperation and (re)building relationships (UNHCR 2003a, 3). ‘Coexistence’ was defined as more than ‘living peacefully side by side but involving some degree of communication, interaction, and even some degree of cooperation’ (Chayes 2003, 152-153).

In BiH, Drvar (Federation) and Prijedor/Kozarac (RS) were selected as target sites. Perhaps learning from the failure of its ‘Open Cities’ project, the UNHCR elected to follow the lead of returnees, in choosing their target locations. These two towns, which experienced high levels of return, had previously been excluded from ‘Open Cities’ funding. In addition, instead of directing funds to mayors who had largely failed to act, funding here was provided at the community and NGO level - to returnees and the domiciled. The UNHCR selected Genesis Project, which had worked on coexistence projects in the past and has a multiethnic staff, as the implementing organization.

Twenty-six projects were executed in the two towns and surrounding areas, by informal groups, local non-governmental organizations and, in one project – the rehabilitation of the local market in Kozarac, by local authorities. Eleven were income-generating projects, five psychosocial, three sports-related, four educational and three cultural. The requirement for funding in each of them was a clear coexistence component, with interethnic participants and staff. Examples of businesses and activities established include strawberry and apple production and other agricultural initiatives, psychosocial assistance to children and a youth journalism club in Prijedor/Kozarac; and a coffee-cake shop, nail production workshop, internet club and basketball club in Drvar (UNHCR 2003a).

Prijedor and Drvar were both areas with difficult return. Bosniaks had returned in large numbers to Prijedor to live as minorities among Serbs; and Serbs had returned in large numbers to live among Croats in Drvar. In both places, tension was high and the two ethnic groups lived segregated lives.

In such contexts, the ‘Imagine Coexistence’ projects were essential and successful in getting communities to start mixing and working together. They also allowed for the restoration of interpersonal relationships. In the aftermath of communal conflict, there are often those who wish to reach out to old friends from the ‘other’ group, but experiences from the
conflict and fear of rejection prevent them from doing so (Adjukovic and Corkalo 2004). Joint activities can create psychologically safe space for old neighbours and friends to approach one another without fear of rejection and for such friendships to regain legitimacy (Adjukovic and Corkalo 2004). The agricultural activities in Prijedor allowed for such interaction through mixed training sessions. A Bosniak women relayed how at a joint training session on strawberry production, she and her Serb neighbours were ‘reintroduced’. This ‘broke the ice’ and enabled them to talk again as neighbours (Chiga and Ganson 2003, 67-68).

Other initiatives contributed to intergroup contact beyond the direct participants. The rehabilitation of the marketplace in Kozarac established ties between the returnee population and local authorities and, similar to the Arizona market, served as a meeting place for people of all ethnic groups (UNHCR 2003b). In Drvar, the coffee and cake shop had a mixed staff and became the first place of its kind not to be characterised as Serb or Croat. Because it was also the first such shop, it drew many people from the town and triggered socialisation between the two groups (Babbitt 2003; UNHCR 2003b). In Prijedor, the youth journalism club also aimed to reach the wider community by introducing news of coexistence-related activities, which was important in spreading the message of coexistence (UNHCR 2003b).

The basketball club in Drvar brought Serb and Croat youth together, which was critical in an environment in which young people had little interaction with each other. Such initiatives were very popular because teenagers had little to fill their time, and they were successful in creating interethnic friendships that continued outside the basketball court. An independent evaluation of the ‘Imagine Coexistence’ projects emphasises that all of the sports projects and many of the youth projects figured prominently in the achievement of coexistence benefits (Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy 2002). A former UNHCR senior officer in Drvar, who evaluated projects in both areas, considered instead the most successful projects to be the ones that promote economic benefits. He stressed the importance of having a structure in place and working toward something, to really bring people together. Participants come to the realization that ‘goals could not be attained through the energy and the resources of one group without the other one’ (Amir 1998, 170). This involvement of different groups in practical steps to achieve common goals can transform relationships and build trust (Blagojevic 2007).

Twenty-one out of 26 of the projects continued to function after ‘Imagine Coexistence’ came to a close in July 2002 (UNHCR 2003b). It is difficult to gauge the extent to which the initiative as a whole was successful in building solid cross-ethnic relationships and promoting sustainable coexistence in Drvar, as the displaced Croat population that was living there in 2001–2002 has since returned to its prewar homes. Drvar is once again a monoethnic Serb
town. Prijedor, on the other hand, remains multiethnic, and one of the founders of Genesis Project claims that the projects had an impact in the town, noting that although the levels of trust are not what they were before the war, they are considerably better than they were five years prior. Diana Chigas and Brian Ganson find that the initiatives resulted in participants coming to see each other in a positive light. Many of them reported that they ‘came to trust individuals involved in their projects from other ethnic groups’ (Chigas and Ganson 2003, 68).

In her evaluation of ‘Imagine Coexistence,’ Professor Eileen Babbitt stresses that one of the most valuable aspects of the projects was the ‘space for dialogue,’ meaning physical and psychological room to meet and talk with people across the ethnic divide about deeper issues. Genesis Project was a strong proponent of creating such spaces – and even adapted the UNHCR definition of ‘coexistence’ to include ‘engaging in trust building.’ In addition to meeting to discuss community projects and joint decision-making, Genesis ran regular training workshops for project leaders and beneficiaries, with a trained psychologist on staff. Such sessions, which included project leaders bringing a beneficiary from an ethnic group different from their own and role-playing, were designed to breakdown stereotypes, build tolerance and empathy. In one of the sessions in Drvar, one of the Serb participants played the role of a displaced Croat woman and realized that their situations were very similar (Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy 2002, 30 and 35-36).

Ethnically mixed group training sessions is also a technique used by Zene za Zene, a women’s organization in BiH that provides money and skills-training to women to begin their own businesses. A staff member described how through sessions and dialogue in the divided Croat-Bosniak town of Bukovača, Croat and Bosniak women realized that they all faced violence in different forms. This was essential in building trust among the participants and empathy in their shared suffering. This in turn, allows for rehumanization of the ‘other’ (Halpern and Weinstein 2004b). Alongside economic incentives and capacity building, specific attention to dialogue and fostering empathy in social reintegration initiatives has tremendous potential to heal individuals and societies.

The Challenging Political Context

Politicians and other leaders in Bosnia and Herzegovina have yet to articulate a discourse of commonality, shared values and tolerance. Instead, many still harbour nationalist views and hold on to divisive narratives of the past and perceptions of ethno-national victimisation. They continue to play on insecurity and fear of the ‘other’, a tool used prior to and during the war in order to maintain ethnic support and ethnic voting. Such top-down ethnic discourse and political
rhetoric impact upon local socialisation processes – and can have a divisive and polarising effect within and among communities (Juhász 2007). In such a context, the barriers to reintegration are high and inter-ethnic relations and acts of reconciliation take ‘civil courage’ (Stefansson 2010, 71; see also O’Loughlin 2010).

Coexistence and reintegration initiatives put those involved in direct confrontation with nationalist political leaders because they challenge notions of identity, collective myths and divisive narratives (Chigas and Ganson 2003). Local authorities have the power to undermine coexistence activities and can make their implementation difficult. The ‘Imagine Coexistence’ projects had to cope with the refusal of required permits and restrictions on the use of public space (Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy 2002).

At the same time, political structures and normative community influences that do not tolerate cross-ethnic engagement can constrain the wider effect of such initiatives. Changes in attitudes and perceptions may remain limited to the direct participants and their interactions with each other. Further, participants may feel the need to keep these changes private once outside the safe space created by coexistence and reintegration initiatives, in order to conform to prevailing attitudes and to avoid being ostracised by members of their own ethnic group for socialising with the ‘other’ (Chigas and Ganson 2003; Halpern and Weinstein 2004a; Stefansson 2010; Stover and Weinstein 2004).

Even among Bosnians who interact regularly across the divide and seek to establish inter-ethnic relationships, there is often a shared recognition that discussion of sensitive and divisive political and moral issues related to the war should be avoided (Helms 2010; Stefansson 2010; Jansen 2010b). In the absence of a genuine spirit of national reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, those who participate in coexistence initiatives and inter-ethnic encounters are constrained in their ability to engage in open political debate about the past and their different ‘truths’. Collective silence is considered less risky and more conducive to peaceful coexistence in local everyday life (Jansen 2010b).

In order to scale up the reach of coexistence initiatives and to facilitate deeper reconciliatory processes, larger social and political contexts must also be reformed. This requires the implementation of other peace-oriented programmes, alongside coexistence activities, that can address structural forces (Chigas and Ganson 2003; Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy 2002; Halpern and Weinstein 2004a; Pickering 2006; Burns 2001).
Conclusion

Initiatives that integrate attention to trust-building, dialogue, social and economic needs and community development can produce significant benefits. They require innovation, time and dedication on the part of participants, project leaders and funders.

However, to date, the UNHCR and the international community have not shown adequate interest in such initiatives nor provided the necessary long-term commitment. The UNHCR’s commitment to ‘Imagine Coexistence’ lasted only eighteen months, which included the planning component. Some projects simply ended when UNHCR funding ended; while many others continued, it was a struggle for some (Chigas and Ganson 2003). Even more problematic is that communities felt abandoned after UNHCR’s withdrawal (Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy 2002). Such feelings of betrayal have the potential to undermine peoples’ belief in the coexistence message.

There was also a missed opportunity to develop a strong coalition for change. Project leaders in the ‘Imagine Coexistence’ project had begun through training sessions to develop into an effective network of coexistence leaders in their communities. The short time-line for the initiative, however, meant that there was insufficient investment in processes and structures that would have allowed them to maintain their coalition and become a sustained voice for coexistence in the face of political hostility (Chigas and Ganson 2003).

Nonetheless, ‘Imagine Coexistence’ was still a tremendous breakthrough for the UNHCR. It was a genuine response to the organization’s acknowledged shortfall in attention to ways to address deep distrust between ethnically divided communities in areas of return (UNHCR 2003a).

This ‘shortfall’ is emblematic of international efforts in general. Actors seeking to help rarely address the problem of devastated relationships (Chayes and Minow 2003). Post-conflict processes are usually focused on physical reconstruction tasks such that aspects of reconciliation are treated as lower priority (Galtung 2001). Nada, the founder of a Czech NGO operating in BiH, noted that while her organization has received much funding from the Czech government for reconstruction projects, they have yet to receive approval for any of their proposed reconciliation projects.35

The UNHCR, in its BiH Policy for 2006, recommended that domestic resources such as the ‘Return Fund’ be directed to reconciliation projects, and away from reconstruction projects, which are now less essential (UNHCR BiH 2005, 3). Nonetheless, as noted, the Bosnian Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees has insisted that funds continue to be directed primarily
to housing reconstruction. Further, the UNHCR’s recommendation seems to allude to a staging process - that reconciliation should come to the fore at this juncture *only* because reconstruction is largely fulfilled. But, as Antonia Chayes and Martha Minow emphasized: ‘Coexistence lends itself to immediate consideration … [R]uptured relationships cannot wait’ (Chayes and Minow 2003). Coexistence must be mainstreamed into all return efforts.

Many of the initiatives discussed provide indicators of how return, reconstruction, reintegration, coexistence and reconciliation can work alongside. It is possible to design projects that incorporate reconstruction, return and coexistence. It is possible to design projects that incorporate income-generation, community development, return and coexistence. This has been done by USAID, UMCOR, UNDP and UNHCR, in their work in BiH, as well as by local organizations, such as Zene za Zene and Ipak. Their initiatives have been constructive and should be adopted as models upon which to build.

There also needs to more strategies and efforts to involve local authorities and political leaders in such initiatives. This would have the potential to expand the impact of the project beyond the direct community participants and to create safe political space for coexistence activities and deeper dialogue (Chigas and Ganson 2003). For example, one of the project leaders in Imagine Coexistence in Prijedor was a member of the municipal assembly. He spoke positively about the benefits of the project to his peers and sought to win the backing of the city (Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy 2002, 30). Although the many nationalist politicians in Bosnia are unlikely to be receptive to such initiatives, there are some alternative political forces that have emerged in recent years. These parties adopt a more inclusive approach and could be more open to coexistence programmes (Fischer 2006c).

Further, there needs to be greater inter-agency coordination for efficient, comprehensive and long-term planning of economic and social reintegration. The UNHCR has sought in the past to institutionalise relationships with development organizations, such as the UNDP and the World Bank. This needs to be pursued further. Efforts should also be made to partner with the private sector to promote employment; and with international and local actors in the field of reconciliation. Such collaborations would allow for pooling of funds and sharing of expertise. They would also, perhaps, draw more focus to reintegration, coexistence and reconciliation from national and international communities and allow for sustained attention to these long-term processes.

Such concerted efforts and integrated initiatives are greatly needed in Bosnia and Herzegovina to deal with the persistent economic and social ills. They are needed to ensure that Bosnians who survived the war do not continue to struggle during peacetime. They are
needed to ensure that return is sustainable and reintegration possible. They are needed to ensure that neighbours throughout the country will once again feel at ‘home’ and sit down together and have a coffee.
Endnotes

1 The term ‘Bosnian’ is used as short-form for the term ‘Bosnian-Herzegovinian’.
2 As of 2000, the population of BiH was 48% Bosniak, 37.1% Serb, 14.3% Croat and 0.6% Other – similar to before the war (CIA World Factbook).
4 Personal interviews, Bosnian Croat returnees, Doboj/Derventa area, BiH, 30 July 2006.
5 The OHR was established by Dayton as the chief civilian peace implementation agency in BiH.
6 A similar return conference was held in Banja Luka on 28 April 1998.
7 Annual returns were 67,445 in 2000 and 92,061 in 2001; UNHCR Statistics, ‘Total Minority Returns in/to BiH from 1996 to 31 December 2005.’
8 Unemployment rates were higher in RS than the Federation. The number of youth unemployed was recorded at 116,587 out of a total of 470,000 official unemployed.
9 Personal interview, OHR rule of law advisor, Sarajevo, BiH, 19 July 2006.
10 Personal interview, OSCE human rights advisor, Sarajevo, BiH, 17 July 2006.
11 Personal interview, UNDP Support to Results-based Approach (SUTRA) officer, Sarajevo, BiH, 18 July 2006; personal interview, Bosnian Croat returnee, Doboj/Derventa area, BiH, 30 July 2006.
12 Personal interview, Bosnian NGO worker, Sarajevo, BiH, 20 July 2006.
13 N.D., e-mail message to author, 7 June 2006.
15 Personal interview, USAID minority returns officer, Sarajevo, BiH, 20 July 2006.
16 Mostar (Federation) and Prijedor (RS) are the towns where the surveys were conducted.
17 Personal interview, Bosnian NGO worker, Sarajevo, BiH, 20 July 2006.
18 Personal interview, Bosniak returnee to Prijedor, Prijedor, BiH, 15 July 2006.
19 Personal interview, Bosnian worker on Dutch reconstruction programme, Sarajevo, BiH, 20 July 2006.
20 Religious identity directly reflects ethnic identity. Bosniaks generally are associated with Islam, Croats with the Roman Catholic Church, and Serbs with the Serbian Orthodox Church.
21 Personal interview, UNHCR protection officer, Banja Luka, BiH, 14 July 2006.
For example, one beneficiary chose to make a wrought iron gate for the local mosque as his contribution.

Personal interview, UNDP-SUTRA officer, Sarajevo, BiH, 18 July 2006.

Ibid.

Personal interview, Bosnian representative of the Danish Refugee Council, Sarajevo, BiH, 21 July 2006.

For more information, see USAID website, “If you build it, they will come,” http://www.usaid.ba/.

Personal interview, UNHCR senior field clerk, Banja Luka, BiH, 14 July 2006; personal interview, former Bosnian Serb returnee to Drvar and former UNHCR officer, Sarajevo, BiH, 18 July 2006.

Personal interviews, local development workers, Sarajevo, BiH, 20 and 21 July 2006.

Personal interview, Bosnian NGO worker, Banja Luka, BiH, 14 July 2006.

Personal interview, former Bosnian Serb returnee to Drvar and former UNHCR officer, Sarajevo, BiH, 18 July 2006.

Personal interview, Bosnian NGO worker, Banja Luka, BiH, 14 July 2006.

Personal interview, Bosnian NGO worker, Sarajevo, BiH, 20 July 2006.

Personal interview, Czech NGO worker, Višegrad, BiH, 31 July 2006.

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