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Democracy, Territoriality and Ethno-National Conflict: A Framework for Studying Ethno-Nationally Divided Cities
Part II

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Editorial note
This is the second part of a conceptual framework within which to understand ethno-nationally divided cities and contested states. It complements rather than following directly from the first part (Working Paper No. 1) which focused on the origins of divided cities in the failings of nation- and state-building at the edges of empire. The paper seeks to show that democracy, territorality and ethno-national conflict are mutually informing. It seeks to establish that the roots of the cities’ conflicts are to be found in the limitations of territorial representative democracy, with the corollary that conflict moderation and resolution require border-crossings and additional forms of participatory democracy.
Biographical note

James Anderson is one of the project investigators and Emeritus Professor of Political Geography at Queen’s University Belfast. His research interests have centred on state borders and territoriality, nationalism, transnational developments and geopolitics. As well as attempting to develop a geopolitical framework for studying ethno-nationally divided cities, his particular project interests include the political demography of ethno-national conflict and alternative approaches to conflict management or resolution.

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Democracy, Territoriality and Ethno-National Conflict: A framework for studying ethno-nationally divided cities – Part II

James Anderson

Abstract

This paper argues that conventional democracy is based on territoriality but is severely limited by it. Its shortcomings are increasing with ‘globalisation’, and they are clearly exposed where they result in ethno-national conflicts about territory. Democracy relies on territory as the basis of representation and can derive legitimacy from it. But it is overly identified with the territoriality of the national state to the near total exclusion both of participatory democracy and the democratisation of transnational and local cross-border processes. Territoriality is two-sided, a sometimes blunt instrument whose strengths become weaknesses which call for non-territorial forms of social and political organisation. These problems, compounded by nationalism, help explain the intractability of ethno-national conflicts and the failings of territorial ‘solutions’. They call for border-crossing democracy or democratic trespass to reconcile democracy and territoriality.

Keywords: representative, participatory, nationalism, transnationalism, sovereignty, borders, trespass, non-territoriality

Contemporary democracy is overly identified with its most common representative form and its basis in territory, especially national state territory. Territory crucially provides a hierarchy of ready-made and often generally accepted electoral ‘communities’ or constituencies, but our democracy is impoverished in being largely and almost exclusively confined to such territorially-delimited communities and their ‘representatives’. This conventional reliance on territoriality - a spatial mode of social organisation where bordered geographical spaces are used to classify or control - generally marginalises or squeezes out other types of political community and other perhaps more appropriate non-territorial forms of democracy - direct, participatory or deliberative. It is a serious problem with increased cross-border and ‘globalisation’ processes now eluding democracy. Democratic control remains circumscribed by notions of national sovereignty and the territorial arenas of national states, despite ‘globalisation’. Democracy is arbitrarily truncated at the border, ‘kept inside’ like a prisoner and like a trespasser told to ‘keep out’.
The ensuing problems are seen most dramatically in ethno-national conflicts (as in Ireland, the Balkans or Palestine-Israel), and by extension (though sometimes especially) in cities central to these conflicts (Belfast, Mostar, Jerusalem...). And not surprisingly, because these conflicts are about strengthening and defending state and ethno-national borders, or, alternatively, relaxing, re-locating or removing them. Heavily territorial and territorialising, the disputes are about territory, territorially-defined communities, ‘majorities’ and ‘minorities’. They are democracy’s ‘dark side’. Borders which often appear as the solution to problems are themselves the problem; and here the solutions may be found in border-crossing and democratic trespass.

This paper (1) attempts to show that territoriality and democracy with their respective strengths and weaknesses are mutually revealing about each other, and that both are central to understanding ethno-national conflict and the search for conflict resolutions. It is part of a conceptual framework for studying divided cities inasmuch as it provides an understanding of the conflicts in which they are embroiled.(2).

Section 1 discusses the general relations between democracy and territory, territoriality as a mode of social organisation, and non-territorial conceptions of community. This provides a basis for Section 2, outlining key limitations of contemporary democracy, including the absence of non-territorial and non-representative forms, and the paradox of democracy’s undemocratic origins which is particularly salient in ethno-national conflict. Capitalism’s partial separation of ‘politics’ from ‘economics’ facilitates the exclusions of economic production and cross-border or transnational processes from the remit of conventional democracy, while also distancing nationalist politics from economic interests. Sections 3 and 4 then discuss how these problems of territoriality and democracy are clearly exemplified and extended in ethno-national conflict and the failings of territorial ‘solutions’. The problems are compounded by flaws in nationalism, and together they help explain the characteristic virulence and intractability of conflict. All constitute imperatives for border-crossing democracy and lead to the conclusion that democratic trespass is a general necessity.
1. Democracy, territoriality and community

Democracy literally means ‘rule by the people’, the demos, but what it actually means in practice, or should ideally mean, is highly variable and debateable: ‘what sort of rule’, ‘over what issues’, ‘which people’, ‘who decides’? ‘The people’ themselves, or their representatives; and by simple majority vote, or do ‘minority communities’ have particular rights? And how should ‘the people’ or ‘community’ be defined? Doing it in terms of territory has a long history. Originally demos had connotations of ‘place’, and hence by extension referred to ‘the people’ as the inhabitants of a particular area, already a territorial community. It seems democracy was territorial from the start, and for good reasons despite territoriality’s weaknesses and problems; not to be lightly dismissed, and considering territoriality’s strengths to be supplemented rather than superseded.

Territoriality

Democracy shares fully in the strengths and weaknesses of territoriality as a very powerful and ubiquitous but flawed mode of social organisation, and a concept meriting more attention. As Robert Sack (1986, 21-34) has elaborated, it uses bordered spaces or places for purposes of social control, classification, communication and symbolism. It operates by delimiting geographical 'territories' so as to include and exclude things and people and control cross-border movements in, out and between different areas. It expresses and implements relationships of power, whether peaceful or violent, malign or benign, across most spheres of human activity (e.g., providing ‘prisons’ and ‘sanctuaries’, and safe areas for children’s play; protecting private property, and personal privacy; organising workforces in workplaces; and giving voting and other rights to people in some areas while denying others).

Territoriality’s advantages include simplifying issues of control, management and administration; giving power relationships more material or symbolic tangibility; and providing easily understood markers ‘on the ground’ to denote variable rights to possession and belonging, inclusion or exclusion. For representative democracy it provides the crucial hierarchy of bordered territorial units at different spatial scales or ‘levels’ - electoral wards and the constituencies of local, regional and national government, up to but usually not beyond the level of national states (the weak European Parliament an ‘exception which
proves the rule’). This pre-given territorial framework of standard ‘political communities’ or ‘all-purpose’ electoral units - where elected representatives decide on matters deemed to effect the respective territorial communities - gives legitimacy to decisions in that the framework pre-dates and is independent of, or not ‘biased’ by, the particular interests and issues of the moment. Decisions are further distanced from implications of ‘bias’ by the framework’s more abstract spatial basis in territory rather than in the social attributes of voters. But even more important, as we shall see, the pre-given framework prevents or pre-empts the problem of democracy’s undemocratic origins becoming a recurring one (except of course where the territorial framework is disputed as in ethno-national conflict): it obviates any need to decide the constituency of voters each time according to the people actually affected issue by the issue, which could be difficult or impossible to achieve by purely democratic means.

However, territoriality’s advantages can become serious disadvantages. Simplification easily becomes over-simplification and physical space can be crudely equated with social space, an often unwarranted conflating of the social and the spatial. While giving greater tangibility to power relationships, territoriality de-personalises and reifies them. It is used as a conscious instrument of class power, as in the control of migrant labour in various pernicious and contradictory ways at borders (see Anderson and Shuttleworth 2007); but in many instances it has unintended consequences as borders indiscriminately truncate social processes. Territoriality can be a blunt and crudely distorting instrument. Considering not only its ubiquity, power and advantages but also its disadvantages and harmful effects - not least in limiting democracy - the concept has been surprisingly under-examined, forgotten or avoided by social scientists including geographers (3).

One of its major expressions is the ‘inside/outside’ dichotomy at state borders between ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’ affairs, which underpins the general negation of democracy in the inter- and trans-national sphere (and a debilitating disciplinary division between Political Science focusing on ‘the state’ and including democracy, and a usually separate field of International Relations (IR) between many states - Walker 1993). Thus while many processes and their effects do cross the border, democracy generally does not, and the result is undemocratic trespass (environmental pollution for instance seeps through or wafts across). The standard electoral unit may not be the most relevant or appropriate ‘community’ for taking decisions on particular issues; and the generally unquestioned
sovereignty of the national state is called into question once cross-border connections are considered As David Held points out:

“Territorial borders specify the basis on which individuals are included and excluded from participation in decisions affecting their lives ... but the outcomes of these decisions ... often stretch beyond national frontiers. The implications of this are troubling, not only for the categories of consent and legitimacy but for all the key ideas of democracy: the nature of a constituency, the meaning of representation, the proper form and scope of political participation, the extent of deliberation, and the relevance of the democratic nation-state as the guarantor of the rights, duties and welfare of subjects.” (Held 2006, 290-2).

**Communities, territorial and non-territorial**

Territorial ‘community’ is defined by bounded space on the assumption that people who share contiguous physical space also interact *socially* and share interests and problems in common. This assumption and conflation has always had weaknesses for democracy, but they have increased with ‘globalisation’, growing cross-border mobilities and environmental concerns. Yet territorial communities still dominate politically over non-territorial ones based directly on social interests, despite a weakening of their territorial basis and the frequent inefficiency of territoriality in delimiting genuine communities.

Huge advances in technologies for moving people, things and information but unequal access to them mean that *some* people’s actual social communities are more likely to be spatially *dis*continuous, less territorially-delimited or defined by function and interest rather than territory. Increasingly some people are likely to have more in common with individuals and groups living in another part of their city or country, or indeed across the border in another country, than with their next-door neighbours. They have ‘community without propinquity’. Their social networks are likely to vary more widely for different functions or purposes. Conversely, people supposedly part of the same territorial community may in fact be mutual strangers with nothing in common except a location inside the same borders. In consequence, as the traditional territorially-based ‘all purpose’ social community weakens, the social base for territorially-defined representative democracy becomes less coherent (or more *in*coherent, for these communities, being class- and otherwise ‘divided’, in most cases were never fully ‘coherent’).
The ‘nation’ with its claim to exercising ‘national sovereignty’ in the ‘national interest’ is currently one of the strongest forms of territorial community, but even here the notion of a common - ‘national’ - interest is highly debateable, intersected as it is by conflicting interests. Most territorial communities of any size - if they function as such - are likely to be class-alliances and coalitions. This points to important ways in which a territorial system of representation in effect ‘distances the masses from democracy’: often the electoral units do not constitute functioning communities in any real social sense and they cannot have their own coherent voice, in contrast to some non-territorial organisations (such as ones based around particular interests, activities or workplaces) where the members are in regular social contact with one another. Territorial community is generally a weak basis for mandating representatives or holding them to account compared with participatory and direct democracy in non-territorial communities.

However, this is emphatically not to argue that territorial communities be ‘abandoned’, any more than representative democracy should be. Rather both need supplementing. As Doreen Massey (2005) has warned, long-distance communications may reduce “the significance of those who live next door”, with cyberspace suggesting a “disembedding into non-contiguous communities of people-like-us”. But exaggerating this trend, or downplaying the continuing relevance of contiguity and propinquity in physical space, would be to “undermine one of the truly productive characteristics of material spatiality - its potential for the happenstance juxtaposition of previously unrelated trajectories”; it would be to evade the challenges and miss (or reject) the opportunities of ‘thrown-togetherness’ in space, including its provision of “potentially creative crucibles for the democratic sphere” (Massey 2005, 94-5, 153).

So there are positive reasons why territorial communities including national states are likely to remain politically important, and they include retaining and defending the limited forms of territorial democracy that are currently available. But at the same time these need supplementing with non-territorial communities and associated participatory forms of democracy, within, across and beyond state borders.
2. The poverty of contemporary democracy

The historical trajectory seems to have been that as electoral representation was widened to become more socially inclusive, the content of the democracy on offer was diluted. Within its traditional arenas of state territory it is now being eroded, despite claims of ‘national sovereignty’, and it barely reaches beyond these arenas. Large swaths of modern capitalist society elude democratic control for non-territorial as well as territorial reasons, and this combination is perhaps best understood in terms of the capitalist separation of ‘politics’ and ‘economics’. The limitations of liberal representative democracy include the paradox of its undemocratic origins, but its weaknesses are most vividly highlighted by contrasts with the participatory forms it generally marginalises.

Participatory democracy

Comparisons with alternative models of democracy, including liberal participatory, deliberative and direct (see Held 2006, 209-215, and 224-252), expose the impoverishment of a democracy limited to territorial communities and representation. For instance, deliberative democracy can involve the general public in developing and setting political agendas rather than simply voting for alternatives on agendas already decided by others, whether by the territorial representatives or by even smaller and more unrepresentative elites. Deliberation is geared to improving the quality of democracy through informed public debate, a public sharing of knowledge and a striving for reasoned, non-partisan decisions (using various mechanisms such as opinion polls, referenda and citizens’ juries). In the case of direct democracy, associated more with socialism than liberalism and with trade union and workplace collectives rather than territorial communities, major decisions can be taken collectively by the people themselves rather than by ‘representatives’. Elected delegates are mandated by collective decision on how to vote on particular issues in higher level assemblies and are subject to ‘report back’, recall and, if necessary, replacement. In contrast, liberal representative democracy only allows people to vote as individuals and at lengthy intervals; they usually have little chance of ensuring their representatives actually represent their views or keep electoral promises; and even less chance of replacing them - until the next election comes round in up to four or more years by which time it may be too late. Participatory forms, by contrast, can draw on a wide range of civil society organisations and active collectives - including international as well as national NGOs and
social movements - many of which constitute functioning communities with a coherent voice, their members in regular social contact with one another, their representatives subject to continuous or frequent democratic pressures from the members.

Thus participatory democracy can supplement and strengthen representative democracy in several 'positive-sum' ways. Firstly, it can minimise two potential flaws which have been stressed by anti-democrats from Plato onwards: the danger that the rule of the majority is usurped and becomes rule by its 'representatives'; and the danger that majority rule turns into arbitrary and oppressive 'majoritarianism' (Held 2006, 203). The latter has direct relevance for 'minorities' in ethno-national conflicts where *ethnos* may be conflated with *demos*, and majorities and their states become in effect *ethnocratic* instead of *democratic*, riding roughshod over minorities, as Yiftachel (2006) demonstrates in the case of Israeli and its undemocratic (to put it mildly) treatment of Palestinians.

Secondly, the more flexible forms of participatory democracy can more readily cross borders. They are not in principle tied to territory or a territorially-defined community as liberal representative democracy seems to be (4). Discussing deliberative democracy, Held (2006, 250) makes the important point that referenda should include 'all citizens significantly affected by a policy question at local or national levels' (emphases added), but of course his 'all' should have included cross-border or transnational 'levels', and that is precisely what the pre-given and inflexible territorial frameworks of representative democracy generally prevent. Conversely, these all-purpose electoral frameworks often include people who are *not* 'significantly affected' by (or interested in) particular policies.

Extending representative democracy across borders through new and rather static state-like government structures (while not impossible, as we shall see) is inherently difficult. Extending looser forms of participatory democratic governance through already existing cross-border processes is much easier, as John Dryzek (2000, 5, 115-129) argues for deliberative democracy. It is easier if we think, not in terms of voting and representatives, but of participating in deliberations which may be within fixed territories but can also readily cope with fluid borders and with crossing them. An ambitious cosmopolitan model of new structures at different levels of authority, including continental and other supra-state assemblies and a reformed United Nations, has been drawn up by David Held (1995, 232-4, 272-8); but while the architectural plans are impressive, who or where are the builders?
It is unclear who might build these structures of cross-border democracy and world government, but as Richard Falk rather acutely observed, “The only elites... likely to contemplate world government favourably in the forseeable future are those that currently seem responsible for the most acute forms of human suffering”. Instead he, like Dryzek, puts his faith in participatory democracy, instigated by transnational social movements ‘from below’ (Falk 1995, 7, 119-120).

“[D]emocracy without boundaries means that the intimate link between democracy and the state can be severed” (Dryzek 2000, 128). Cross-border participation opens up new dimensions for democracy. As Bohman argues, states themselves can become more democratic only if they begin to practice democracy across borders; and we need to think not of territorial demos in the singular, as in the national arena, but of demoi in the plural, or a transnational ‘democracy of democracies’(Bohman 2007, 188-190). His suggestion (Bohman 2007, 17) that borders, rather than being simply accepted, ‘must be open to democratic deliberation’ is indeed radical given that democracy’s borders were almost invariably established by physical force rather than democratic means.

**Democracy’s undemocratic origins and weakening trajectory**

The paradox or contradiction that the demos and its the territorial framework for representation cannot be delimited and decided democratically is general and unavoidable. And given the symbolic importance now accorded conventional democracy, this amounts to shaky foundations and a threat to the legitimacy of the state. William Connolly (1991) argues that democratic polities require democratic institutions for the functioning of democracy but democracy is absent until the institutions are established. Hence the original establishment of the institutions, which includes delimiting the territorial base and constituting the demos, is itself necessarily undemocratic in conventional terms.

For the state and its democracy to be accepted as legitimate, these undemocratic origins must be officially denied or concealed in ‘a politics of forgetting’ (Connolly 1991, 464-6). Establishing democratic institutions required action within and against undemocratic social structures, and inevitably the resulting democracy is at least partly shaped by non- or even anti-democratic forces. Historically they included actions by the so-called ‘mob’ - nobody voted on France’s original Bastille Day - and in such instances the social forces involved
can only be defined as ‘democratic’ in terms of their intentions or the effects of their actions, rather than how they themselves were constituted. But many, perhaps most of the forces behind the territorial origin of today’s democratic states, those self-proclaimed ‘cradles of national democracy’, were in fact unambiguously undemocratic, their actions typified by theft, war or ‘ethnic cleansing’, even genocide (see Mann 2005). There is a lot to ‘forget’. Almost by definition, successful states mostly succeed in official ‘forgetting’, but we shall see that in ethno-national disputes the paradox has particular salience because ‘forgetting’ is generally impossible. With any attempt to create a new territorial framework for democracy, the origin problem recurs in the present as a ‘double paradox’. Ironically, the normal way of minimising the problem via a pre-given territorial framework is generally not an option because that is precisely what is in dispute.

Nor are the problems confined to origins. Up to the 19th century the rich and powerful openly opposed democracy as ‘rule by the mob’, and some still do (5). But Anthony Arblaster (1994, 8) contends that democracy lost its ’mob’ image because its substance was weakened to assuage the earlier hostility. Its trajectory, in short, was to become less ‘direct’ and more circumscribed as the franchise was progressively widened to include people ‘with no property, the working class and women. In the 17th century it had been associated with direct participation in public meetings of at least some of the citizens, but by the late 19th century it meant ‘indirect’ democracy where assemblies of elected representatives acted ostensibly on behalf of larger, including national, communities. Direct participation within and against undemocratic social structures, including political agitation for democracy by the so-called ‘mob’, had been essential in establishing representative democracy. Yet now decision-making was effectively distanced from ‘the people’ in various elitist ways. With ‘mass democracy’ and full suffrage for adult men and women by the early 20th century, direct participation was seen as ‘impractical’ because of the numbers involved (though given new information technologies that is a lame excuse). Writing in the 1990s, Arblaster (1994, 103) found that he could not improve on E. H. Carr’s 1951 conclusion:

"Mass democracy is a difficult and hitherto largely uncharted territory; and we should be nearer the mark, and should have a far more convincing slogan, if we spoke of the need, not to defend democracy, but to create it."
That applies even more to transnational democracy as the transnational sphere beyond the reach of democracy expands with ‘globalisation’. Its ‘inside/outside’ exclusion from democracy’s remit is sometimes ‘justified’ by assertions that democracy above the state level is impossible or utopian, for instance a sceptical Robert Dahl (1999, 23) advising that ‘we should openly recognise that international decision making will not be democratic’ (which may of course favour strong states whose ‘might is right’) (6). And Friedrich Hayek, concerned to insulate the ‘liberty’ of capitalists from state ‘interference’ and popular democratic demands, located his ultra-minimal, neo-liberal dream state rather unusually at the inter-state government level above and separated from national democracy (a ‘dream’ the neo-liberal European Union with its so-called ‘democratic deficit’ is in danger of approximating with potentially disastrous consequences for its own legitimacy - Anderson 2006).

However, this negation of democracy wrongly assumes that democracy can only be representative and state territorial, and it has negative ‘blow-back’ on national or popular sovereignty within state arenas. Acting as ‘a transmission belt from the global to the national’, power has become ‘concentrated in those agencies in closest touch with the global economy - the offices of presidents and prime ministers, treasuries, central banks’ (Cox 1992, 30-31). Key decisions involving inter-state relations and transnational processes are monopolised by a small elite of representatives and unelected officials: by, for example, a minority of those in cabinet government, rather than by the whole government, never mind all the representatives debating together, much less the electorate.

Paul Foot’s (2006) account of how ‘the vote was won and then undermined’ in Britain provides a graphic example of the two-sided process of widening the electorate and diluting democracy’s content. The first half of his book is a passionate history of how universal suffrage was achieved in Britain - from the Levellers of the 1640s English Revolution, precocious initiators of modern democracy, through the revival of democratic aspirations in the wake of the American and French Revolutions, to the Chartists and the Suffragettes. The second half is an altogether more miserable story, starting in 1918 with suffrage nearly complete and the Russian Revolution spreading fear among capitalist property-owners: the vote was undermined by the impotence of the British Parliament and the Labour Party which ostensibly represented the working class, a majority of the
population. Foot (2006, 443-4) quotes Tony Benn MP who after a long parliamentary career concluded that “Britain is only superficially governed by MPs and the voters who elect them”. Benn’s wry comment on retiring from Parliament was he was leaving “in order to devote more time to politics”. Not the usual failed and sanctimonious politician who plans ‘to devote more time to my family’; instead eloquent recognition that there is more to politics and democracy than the parliamentary variety. But the key question is why parliament - the representative democratic institution - has been marginalised and rendered impotent, as far as representing the majority of the population is concerned?

Foot’s answer is that the threat to property from the non-propertied majority (the main concern of anti-democrats down the ages) has been the main factor behind the elite curtailing democracy. There was recurring “conflict between parliamentary or political democracy and economic democracy” and “without economic democracy - at least some form of democratic control of industry, finance and services…political democracy will always be at the mercy of a greedy and predatory economic hierarchy”; “the electoral process, whenever it favours labour and the poor, has been consistently thwarted by undemocratic forces it does not control” (Foot 2006, x, 429). ‘Political power’ trumped by ‘economic power’, but this very British story of Labour/New Labour (7) has a deeper and wider significance.

**The separation of ‘politics’ and ‘economics’ in capitalism**

The main source of contemporary democracy’s most serious limitations and exclusions is a ‘politics/economics’ separation which is structural, indeed unique, to capitalism (Wood 1995). It is a key to understanding democracy’s territorial exclusion from the transnational sphere, and its non-territorial exclusion from economic production which applies within the state arena as well transnationally. It also underlies the distancing of economics from nationalist politics (8).

In capitalism economic surpluses are generally extracted from ‘free labour’ by the economic operations of the ‘free market’. This contrasts with the extra-economic means - the direct use of physical force or political and ideological (e.g., religious) ‘persuasion’ - which characterised earlier modes of production and were obviously part and parcel of surplus extraction in slave-owning and feudal societies or ones ruled by a priestly caste.
However, the separation of capitalist ‘economics’ from ‘politics’ is only partial as ‘the market’ and property rights rely on the political protection of the state and its physical force - there is no such thing as a capitalist market which is ‘free’ of state support. But this ‘politics’ is less obvious because it is displaced from the immediate ‘economic’ sphere of production to the ‘political’ sphere of the state; and the partial separation is institutionalised, often expressed in separate ‘economic’ and ‘political’ bodies and a ‘division of labour’ in personnel (and it is reflected in an academic gulf between Economics and Politics even more debilitating than the disciplinary division between Political Science and IR). Furthermore, the partial separation is contested - socialists (like Foot) for instance wanting more state ownership and democratic control of the economy, liberals wanting privatisation and minimal political regulation of markets - and the degree of separation reached a high point with the neo-liberal ‘Washington Consensus’ from the 1980s.

This ‘politics/economics’ separation can perhaps be re-formulated more accurately as a ‘presence/absence’ of democracy. Democracy is the key differentiator: it is not ‘politics’ which is excluded from the sphere of production but rather democratic politics, in deciding for instance what to produce and where to invest (and in practice - although perhaps contested - that can often apply to state-owned industry as well as to privately-owned, both mainly driven by market criteria). This theory and its territorial implications are more fully elaborated elsewhere (Anderson 2001; and 2002, 19-25), but here we can note the main consequences.

Partially separating ‘politics and democracy’ from ‘undemocratic economics’ facilitates the co-existence of formal political equality with gross material exploitation, oppression and inequalities, and to some extent ‘compensates’ for them while putting their economic sources beyond the reach of democracy. Above all, it underlies and helps explain two of the most serious exclusions or partial exclusions in contemporary capitalist democracy: cross-border relations and economic production.

Economic production is excluded as decisions about where to invest, who to employ, what to produce, buy, sell, and so forth, are largely separated off to the ‘non-political’, i.e., non-democratic, sphere of ‘economics’. And the exclusion can be even greater where economic processes straddle borders and involve foreign direct investment (FDI). As well as stopping at the gates of the workplace, democracy stops at the border; and interestingly,
‘private property’ and ‘state territory’ are two of the leading instances of the uses of territoriality. The separation of ‘economics’ from ‘politics’ is a pre-condition of the globalisation of economic production across sovereign state borders, and it puts ‘economics’ (including, e.g., branch plant closures and mass redundancies) beyond the reach of national democracy in states both of FDI origin and destination - the undemocratic trespass *par excellence*, though generally not recognised as such. And it is not recognised as such because, conversely, the claims to national sovereignty within state borders have some plausibility due to the ‘politics/economics’ separation which effectively limits the claims to the sphere of ‘politics’ and excludes most of the ‘economics’ sphere (e.g., foreign direct disinvestment) from consideration. Thus “[t]he sovereignty of the nation-state has generally not been questioned” (Held 2006, 290), and has indeed been sanctified or fetishised as an absolute. But in reality it is only a partial and partly achieved claim.

Yet people are still prepared to fight, kill and die for it. The conflicts of ethno-nationalists are about them retaining or trying to achieve their own national sovereignty and democracy. For despite the limitations, having sovereignty and a favourable territorial framework for democracy is better than not having them, and they certainly appear to work for the successful states and nations which (by definition) possess them. But would people fight and die if fully aware of the limitations outlined in sections 1 and 2? Paradoxically, these limitations, compounded by flaws in nationalism, are extended and most clearly exemplified in ethno-national conflict.

3. Ethno-national conflict: the wages of territoriality

State territory and alternative frameworks for representative democracy are the issue in ethno-national conflicts and divided cities. They are at the sharp end where it all goes wrong. The intractability and virulence of the conflicts arise from the impracticality of nationalism’s territorial ideal; from the territorial ‘package’ in which nation, ethnicity, sovereignty and democracy are all knotted together; and from the recurring problem of undemocratic origins which cannot be forgotten.
**Nationalism’s ideal and territorial ‘package’**

Nationalism’s happy geographical ideal that the borders of state and nation coincide has powerful appeal, linking homeland, freedom, democracy, and sovereign self-determination without ‘outside interference’. To each state its own nation, to each nation its own state: existing states (e.g., France) finding expression in a single nation, and in their relative success providing models for nations wanting their own states (e.g., German unificatory nationalism, Basque or Irish separatisms). But nationalism 'promises to deceive'. Geographical realities typically conspire against its happy ideal; and the ‘national interest’ of the territorially-defined community is often an ideological mask for the interests of dominant factions or classes. Nationalism lacks the universality of more abstract political ideologies such as conservatism, liberalism or socialism, in that it is tied to particular territories. Intermingled distributions of ethno-national groups mean the ideal is not attainable, or fully attainable, and attempts to make reality fit the ideal can lead to serious ethno-national conflict. The attempts to achieve the ideal are usually justified in terms of the democratic rights of a national community, but this logic breaks down where two or more such communities have rival claims to the same territory.

The resulting conflicts are serious, sometimes involving the extreme ‘solution’ of ‘ethnic cleansing’, and especially in the modern world where the victims are voters as well as occupiers of territory and ‘democratic majorities’ can be politically engineered (see Mann 2005). Representative democracy has politicised demography (e.g., in Northern Ireland and Palestine/Israel) - territory as container of a particular population mix and a focus of public discourse becomes highly political (McEldowney et al 2010). The conflicts are essentially a product of modern democracy, not explicable as ‘primordial atavism’ or the ‘ancient hatreds’ of ethnicity. But representative democracy cannot itself resolve the conflict over its territorial basis: its framework or shell cannot be decided democratically. Michael Mann (2005) identified the ‘dark side of democracy’ with ethnic cleansing, but perhaps the term is more appropriate for ethno-national conflicts in general (9).

Their intractability stems, not from the evils of ‘human nature’ (there were no such national conflicts before the 18th century), but rather from valued modern principles which are in practice an unattainable amalgam. Democracy, sovereignty, ethnicity and nationalism are seen as a ‘total package’ tightly wrapped up in territoriality. They mutually
reinforce one another, and together they are tied to particular territories rather than existing separately as abstract principles. Breaching the sanctity of sovereignty is difficult because it is protected by the other elements. It is difficult to unpack them and compromise on some of the contents. For they are paraded as the norm and badge of successful statehood by some very powerful states. These states are not just caught in the ‘territorial trap’ (Agnew 1994), they flaunt it.

Modern territorially-defined sovereignty emerged in relatively centralised territorial states, and was first theorised by Bodin in France in terms of the absolute rule of the king, the ‘sovereign’. But in the early seventeenth century the radical German Calvinist Althusius ‘democratised’ sovereignty arguing it should belong not to ‘the ruler’ but to ‘the ruled’ - to ‘the people’ as ‘popular sovereignty’ (Hinsley 1986, 126-132). Rousseau picked up on Althusius, and the French Revolution later established ‘the people’ or ‘nation’ as the political and cultural community capable of democratically deciding its own independent, sovereign destiny. Defining ‘who belonged’ to the nation by territoriality was comparatively easy for central elites in already-existing kingdoms and territorial states like France, but decidedly more difficult for nations in search of a state where appropriate borders of statehood had yet to be established. Here ethnicity - and particularly pre-existing religion and/or language groups - generally became the criterion of national community, though state or ‘civic’ nationalisms have also used ethnicity to weld together a nation.

Nation and state-building have however been particularly problematical where nations in search of states encountered geographically mixed or intermingled ethnicities, and also sometimes opposition from a state nationalism or an imperial power (as in ‘divided cities’ at the edge of empire – Working Paper No. 1). Here ethno-nationalism is often moralistically blamed for the ensuing conflict over territory (10), but this can obscure the complex interactions of nationalism with imperialism exemplified in such conflicts (Anderson and O'Dowd 2007). Another option is to support ‘oppressed’ against ‘oppressor’ nations (supporting their democratic impulse but not necessarily their methods).

The conflicts exemplify the additional point that territoriality - historically associated with ‘terrorising’ (11) - actively sharpens conflict and generates further conflict by encouraging rival territorialities in a ‘space-filling process’. It directly encourages the ‘zero-sum’ thinking typical of both (or all) sides in these conflicts. Territory is a finite resource with a fixed total
or ‘sum’ where more for one side really does mean less for the other. But this equation is then inappropriately applied to ‘goods’ (e.g., economic wealth, cultural capital, political democracy) which do not have a fixed total. ‘Positive-sum games’ where both sides would gain are blocked; and instead the reality is usually in fact a ‘negative-sum game’ where both lose (though often unequally).

The recurring ‘double paradox’

In these conflict situations territoriality also contributes directly to the intractability by re-creating the ‘undemocratic origins’ paradox. As we saw, the demos and its democratic framework could not be delimited democratically. Existing state borders were usually established by violence or threat rather than democracy, whether this framework for democracy was established before or after the advent of mass democracy. Undemocratic origins have to be officially ‘forgotten’ for democracies to be accepted as legitimate, and in now securely-established national states they are diplomatically forgotten for most practical purposes. This applies to historical origins in the past but is generally impossible in ethno-national conflicts where past origins are major bones of contention and vividly remembered - as William Faulkner put it, ‘The past is not dead. It’s not even past’. Or it is invented and reinvented which amounts to the same thing, feeding grievance, feeding conflict, the conflicting stories daily retold (perhaps not quite what Renan had in mind when he called nationalism a ‘daily plebiscite’ on subjective belonging).

Additionally, the paradox also applies to ‘new origins’ - to any and all proposed territorial solutions to conflict which institute a new demos or adjust the existing democratic framework. All are subject to the same inevitable paradox. It is repeated in any re-drawings of state borders, their legitimacy inevitably open to challenge as ‘undemocratic’ in conventional terms (though clearly some solutions are more undemocratic than others). And this in a ‘democratic era’, whereas some of the securely-established states can at least try to plead that their origins pre-dated mass democracy. Ethno-national conflicts recreate and add to Connolly’s paradox as the ‘double paradox’ of representative democracy’s undemocratic origins in the present. It is a recurring paradox which cannot be forgotten and that makes the management or resolution of conflict so much more difficult.
In conventional democracy ‘the electorate decides’. But the prior question here is who decides the electorate? The question is especially fraught because the framework which cannot be decided democratically may well pre-determine the outcomes of subsequent democratic voting. By way of illustration, in the Northern Ireland conflict should matters have been decided by a vote only in Northern Ireland; or in NI plus the Republic of Ireland (as happened though separately with the Belfast-Good Friday Agreement’s subsequent ratification); or in NI plus Britain; or in all three territorial entities, for all three electorates were substantially affected by the conflict? Of course eventually all three were formally represented in the United Kingdom and Irish governments’ combined approach, but that is not quite the same thing, and arguably if all three electorates had been directly involved, rather than just the NI one, the armed conflict might perhaps have been ended sooner. Likewise if the European Union or the United Nations had not been excluded. For long – too long – the conflict was seen as a purely ‘internal’ matter for the sovereign UK, until the Irish government was allowed in as a ‘junior partner’ and with the USA helped broker a deal (Anderson 2008). But the basic point here is that such matters cannot be decided democratically. The question ‘who decides’ becomes an infinite regression of ‘who decides who decides…’ and it is terminated undemocratically, if at all.

The conflict may continue until one of the protagonists tries to force a ‘decision’ or ‘solution’ by unilateral action, something the paradox actively invites and which is as likely to perpetuate conflict. Alternatively, an ‘acceptable’ framework for democracy has to be imposed by external powers or ‘conflict managers’ pragmatically enforcing a solution (though perhaps with marginal plebiscites about the allocation of small areas, and/or subsequent referenda to ratify and give a veneer of ‘democratic legitimacy’ to what they have already decided). They may or may not be reasonably benign and even-handed (12), but either way the paradox still applies. It is reflected in the territorial ‘solutions’ of partition or new borders and by internal ‘consociational’ power-sharing within existing ones.

4. Territorial ‘solutions’ and the necessity of trespass

The failures or at best limited success of territorial ‘solutions’ further exemplify and add another dimension to the problems of territoriality and democracy. They reinforce the case for democratic trespass, for new democratic frameworks which cross state and also
national or ethnic borders. One way this might be achieved is seen in an innovative extension of representative democracy across the Irish border, in effect joining up separate territorial frameworks for some joint decision-making. And, as we saw in Section 2, cross-border democracy also has to harness the greater flexibility of participatory democracy, involving cross-border communities comprising citizens from different states and not just their representatives.

**Partition or internal consociational power-sharing?**

The territorial ‘solutions’ mostly repeat or reproduce the territorial problems of the conflict itself. For example, in Ireland/Northern Ireland, the 1920s partition ‘solution’ almost literally ‘blew up’ in the late 1960s, and three decades later a largely internal power-sharing strategy only began to work when an ‘external’ border-crossing element was added. In general partition ‘solutions’ have a dismal record. The territorial partitioning of rival communities with new borders has thankfully had limited application, mostly in defeated or retreating multi-national empires (e.g., Hungary after WWI; the British from Ireland, Palestine, and India; and Kurdistan and Cyprus are additional cases – see O’Leary 2007). Partition, which has to be distinguished from voluntary secessions and de-colonisations (though they may be linked), creates more problems than it solves. Not surprisingly, they are the same sorts of problems, for partitioning typically amounts to imperialists indulging in (or indulging) nationalism’s unattainable ideal of trying to make national and state borders coincide, and inevitably it is arbitrary even where they do consult the locals (see Anderson and O’Dowd 2007). Sometimes it starts as a temporary expedient (an extension of ‘divide and rule’, or ‘divide and run’), but then becomes permanent, perpetuating conflict with often dire consequences. Because of geographical intermingling, ethno-national groups cannot be properly separated by a territorial border, new minorities are created and - even worse, and because of this - partition is an invitation to ‘ethnic cleansing’. It happened when Palestine was partitioned in 1948 (see Pappe 2006); while India’s 1947 partition (see Fraser 1984) resulted in over 200,000 deaths, some 5 million people forced to migrate, virtually permanent conflict in Kashmir, several India-Pakistan wars, and the continuing threat of nuclear conflict.

Partition by definition, as Brendan O’Leary (2007) shows, is imposed by ‘external’ powers, (in part because of the ‘undemocratic origins’ paradox), but internal power-sharing
too is almost always dependant on external enforcers or ‘managers’. For them, and partly because of partition’s dire consequences, ‘internal ethnic partitioning’ and consociation within existing state borders became the favoured alternative from the 1950s. It regulates conflict within the contested state by giving the rival ethno-national communities institutionalised recognition and guaranteed shares in government power and resources, in rough proportion to their population sizes. There may also be various veto rights to stop the ‘majoritarianism’ of larger communities ‘democratically’ riding rough-shod over minorities; and each community may have substantial autonomy to run its own separate affairs.

This is less likely to fuel conflict than territorial partition but is sharply criticised by people who prioritise the social integration of the rival groups. These ‘integrationists’ argue that the elaborate, guaranteed and hence rather static power-sharing arrangements of consociation rigidify government and confine decision-making ‘undemocratically’ to often private negotiations between a small elite of representatives from each community. But, above all, they argue consociationalism institutionalises, perpetuates and indeed strengthens the ethno-national divisions at the heart of the conflict. It maintains even increases polarisation, keeping people in - even forcing them into - the rival ‘camps’. It thereby erodes the so-called ‘middle ground’ of compromise; and excludes ‘other grounds’ for alternative politics and more fruitful bases for political mobilisation (e.g., gender, class) which cross-cut ethno-national divisions. These are indeed serious tendencies which need consideration. But the ‘integrationists’ over-state their case and are wide open to the criticism of apparently forgetting that serious and often violent conflict had to be stopped or at least reduced before political progress was possible. Power-sharing guarantees were essential to achieve ‘cease-fires’ or even the possibility of productive negotiation. And the integrationists’ priority of ‘integration’ might well seem like assimilation and a threat to group identity, even by majority groups never mind minority ones. However, this debate (see Taylor 2009) is somewhat over-polarised, limited and static.

‘Peace-processes’ need to be seen as processes where different emphases are appropriate at different stages, with the more integrative emphasis generally coming later. But the main problems with the consociation debate arise where both sides agree, or both fail to recognise the territorial dimension. Both have generally accepted the internal nature of consociationalism, which is inadequately radical given the deep-rooted, territorial nature of the conflicts. A core problem or contradiction is that consociation accepts existing
territorial borders where it is these borders that are in dispute. Here so-called ‘internal solutions’ are contradictions in terms.

Partition ‘solutions’ might appear more obviously territorial but the consociational approach is compromised territorially in three respects. Firstly, sustaining internal consociational settlements is generally dependent on the continuing support of often fickle external powers who have their own priorities elsewhere. But their enforcement or support was not theorised as an integral or necessary element of consociationalism until this was clearly established for Northern Ireland and Lebanon by Michael Kerr (2005). Revealingly, consociation was first theorised not with respect to the territorial conflicts of ethno-nationalists, but in the entirely ‘internal’ context of religious divisions in the Netherlands (13).

Secondly, internal consociation, despite its contradictions, appeals to external ‘managers’ precisely because it is not radical and deals more with symptoms than causes; and especially because (in complete contrast to partition) it maintains existing borders and the ‘territorial integrity of the state’, something in which all existing states have a vested interest. Violating this principle is seen as setting a dangerous precedent (e.g., how Kosovo’s separation from Serbia was widely seen in 2008). And so internal power-sharing became the ‘international community’s’ favoured option, explicitly focusing on the ‘self-determination of peoples’ rather than ‘nations’ and so without any implication of separate national statehood or threat to sovereignty (Cassesse 1995). As themselves representatives of national state powers, external managers are caught in the same ‘territorial trap’ (Agnew 1994), the same mind-sets of fetishised national sovereignty, as the ethno-national protagonists they presume to manage. Rather than innovate, they may pander uncritically to the conflicting nationalisms by supporting the presumption they all share, that national identities and territorial sovereignty have over-riding importance over other identities and issues. And so they often do manage rather than resolve conflict, and sometimes they fail even to manage. Consociation has advantages over partition, but to a lesser extent it also prioritises the conflict management expedients of separation and segregation over the resolution necessities of contact and co-operation.
Thirdly, in these territorial conflicts consociation needs support not only from external powers but also from external communities and ones which straddle ethnic and state borders. Consociation may be necessary but it is not sufficient.

**Border-crossing institutions and communities**

Northern Ireland’s Good Friday Agreement (*Agreement* 1998) only became possible when Britain gave up its inconsistent search for the chimera of an ‘internal solution’, by supplementing consociation with cross-border institutional links to the Irish Republic (Anderson 2008). The disputed partition border remained in place, but a significant ‘all-Ireland’ dimension was introduced through a partial linking of the two representative frameworks. In regular meetings of a North-South Ministerial Council (loosely based on the model of sovereignty-sharing in the EU), government ministers from Belfast and Dublin take some joint decisions and co-ordinate policy across a wide range of sectors including agriculture, health, education, tourism, the environment, trade, and language (*Agreement* 1998). There is also an element of participatory democracy in joint North-South policy formulating bodies which include people from a diverse range of civil society organisations, specialist associations, pressure groups and so forth, nominated by the two governments and political parties (14).

There could of course have been a greater cross-border element in the Agreement, more participation and more encouragement of ‘bottom-up’ activities which sustain political communities as active, living entities. (15) But despite the shortcomings, and not being entirely new, Ireland’s cross-border innovations are important in demonstrating how representative democracy can straddle borders and in doing so create or strengthen cross-border communities as a basis for participatory democracy (16). They exemplify the democratic trespass needed to moderate or resolve conflicts over contested borders.

Border-crossing is particularly suited to a strategy or politics of ‘forgetting’ these conflicts and their origins. Rather than ‘remembering’ which can simply re-create the past, it might paradoxically be better to mobilise around other (dare one suggest *more*) important conflicts and struggles involving issues of class, or gender or the environment, or all of these, for in principle they bridge and under-cut the ethno-national and state borders which sustain ‘the’ conflict. In practice it may be difficult, because ethno-national forces will try
and drag people back into their ‘zero-sum’ games and partisan moulds (e.g., fighting for ‘the Catholic’ or ‘the Protestant working class’ rather than ‘the working class’). But border-crossing struggles, communities and participatory democracy in both ethno-national and state senses can be a major antidote to border-(re)producing national conflict, and a good way of ‘forgetting’ it; and their most promising locales may be found in the everyday life of ‘divided cities’ and city-to-city networks across state borders (17). There is no shortage of worthwhile border-crossing conflicts - struggles for jobs and sustainable development, services and rights, including fighting for democracy itself rather than fighting over its shell.

5. Generalising the necessity

Democratic trespass is needed in response to ethno-national conflict but contested borders point the way for borders in general. The limits and flaws of democracy and territoriality are most exposed where they break down in conflict, but the shortcomings are general and inherent.

They are highlighted when ideals meet reality. We saw the dangerous impracticality of nationalism’s territorial ideal that nation and state borders should coincide geographically. Territoriality is deeply implicated in the intractable conflicts that ensue. We saw that compromise is difficult because democracy’s undemocratic origins cannot be forgotten and are continually recreated; and the territorial ‘package’ of democracy, sovereignty, ethnicity and nation cannot easily be disentangled. Territoriality itself directly generates or exacerbates ‘zero-sum’ conflicts. The conflicts and failed territorial ‘solutions’ constitute ‘the dark side of democracy’.

The benefits of border-crossing apply in principle to all state borders - in the absence of conflict there may be less pressure to innovate, but on the other hand it might be easier where relations are not soured by conflict. We saw that economic ‘globalisation’ is only possible because economic production is partially excluded from ‘politics’ and claims to national sovereignty; but with the two-fold problem that both ‘economics’ and cross-border processes are largely excluded from the remit of conventional representative democracy. It usually does not extend beyond national arenas. ‘Globalisation’ necessitates trespass, but currently it is mostly undemocratic trespass and needs democratising.
We saw that conventional territorially-based representative democracy is rather threadbare; that both it and especially participatory democracy are underdeveloped in national arenas, and more especially in transnational spheres. Territoriality can be a crude and misleading way of defining ‘political communities’, limited and limiting. It tends to crowd-out often more appropriate non-territorial communities based on particular interests or functions. Likewise, representative democracy crowds out more flexible forms of participatory democracy which more readily cross borders instead of stopping or being stopped at them.

However, the ‘all-purpose’ territorial community - and particularly its leading expression, the national territorial state - still has its uses and is not about to ‘wither away’ any time soon. National representative democracy is still our main available framework for democratic accountability, hard-won and not to be abandoned, or traded away in favour of participatory democracy in some ‘zero-sum game’. On the contrary, only ‘positive-sum’ games make sense: representative democracy getting much-needed supplements from deliberative and direct democracy in mutually strengthening relationships. Likewise national and transnational democracy, territorial and non-territorial forms - all can be mutually supportive and more effective when working together (18).

The pressures for national and transnational democratisation are increasing though it remains to be seen whether or not they will be met, either in response to ethno-national conflicts or in general. With ‘globalisation’, cross-border communities and processes have been growing, contradictory pressures to strengthen borders are increasing, and transnational tensions from ecological crisis are looming (19). Increasingly, trespass is a general necessity to reconcile territoriality and democracy.
Notes

1. My thanks to the participants and organisers of an invited workshop on democracy at the International Institute for the Sociology of Law, Oñati / University of the Basque Country, April 2008, where an earlier version of the paper was discussed. To Aodán MacPóilín for information on Ireland’s cross-border bodies; to my colleagues Katy Hayward and Milena Komarova for suggesting some restructuring and sharper focusing of the argument; and to Doreen Massey who responded generously to my criticism with helpful comments.

2. Part I of the Framework (Working Paper No.1) focused on origins of divided cities in the failures or partial failures of state- and nation-building; and this part follows it indirectly with a different focus on the failings of territorial democracy.

3. There are exceptions, including for example Jean Gottman (1973), John Agnew (1994), Peter Taylor (1994), and Stuart Elden (2007), as well as Robert Sack (1986), but the neglect has been particularly surprising and detrimental in Geography, ‘the spatial discipline’. Widespread and long-running, it is evident in various histories of the discipline, and from John Nystuen (1963) ‘forgetting’ boundaries as a ‘fundamental spatial concept’, to Doreen Massey’s otherwise rich For Space (2005) - not explicitly or systematically treating borders or territoriality as a major reality of spatiality seems a missed opportunity in a book about how people imagine geographic space.

4. Representative democracy per se is not necessarily territorial, as Doreen Massey commented. Any collective whether territorial or not can devolve decisions to elected representatives; but territoriality is inherent in liberal democratic representation as conventionally understood.

5. Nowadays this hostility is less open, though as Massey noted, opposition to ‘the mob’ and the poor’s right to rule is still a live issue in Latin America.

6. As Tony McGrew (2002) notes, theorists of international relations, except for liberal internationalists, have tended to bracket out democracy, while theorists of democracy have tended to bracket out ‘anarchical’ international society, with communitarians like Kymlicka arguing that the shared history and culture necessary for a ‘democratic community’ are largely absent at transnational levels.

7. The sorry story ends for Foot (2006, x, 412) with the neo-liberals Blair and Brown – “the net result of a hundred years of compromising with capitalism has ended with New Labour, an allegedly social democratic organisation which has surrendered both socialism and democracy.”
8. With negative implications for economic leverage in the politics of peace processes (see, e.g., Ben-Porat 2006). The separation is reflected too in a modern ‘division of labour’ between the national state (politics) and the contemporary city (economics, culture), though the highly politicised divided city runs counter to the general trend.

9. Linking ethnic cleansing to democracy fits best where rival ethno-nationalisms contest particular national territories and statehood, as for example in Palestine (Pappe 2006); less well in Mann’s major case of the Nazi genocide of the Jews across Europe.

10. This moralising is unwarranted, as is seeing ‘civic’ superior to ‘ethnic’ nationalism. ‘Civic’ nationalisms sometimes use ethnicity in very reactionary ways. Moralists who take an anti-nationalism ‘plague on both your houses’ stance are often blind to their own nationalism or that of ‘their own’ state.

11. ‘Territory’ and ‘territoriality’ have linguistic associations with terra meaning ‘land’, but also with terrere, ‘to terrorise or frighten’, and more specifically with the territorium as the land around a city - its ‘territory’ - from which ‘outsiders’ were ‘frightened off’.

12. The USA’s relatively even-handed and constructive intervention in the Northern Ireland conflict has contrasted strongly with its pro-Israeli stance in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict where arguably it is very much part of the problem.

13. In the Netherlands, none of the protagonists belonged to a different nation or different state, neither national nor state borders were at issue, there was no ‘outside interference’, nor was external support needed. By contrast, ethno-national conflicts usually have all or most of these elements. Belgium may be an exception which ‘proves the rule’, though whether it can sustain consociation without external support is now debateable.

14. The ‘implementation bodies’ dealing with the Irish language, the Ulster-Scots dialect, inland waterways, joint fisheries, special EU programmes, trade and businesses, formulate policy subject to approval by the Ministerial Council.

15. For instance, an ‘Island Social Forum’ to give relatively marginalised groups a say in policy formulation) had been proposed (Anderson and Goodman 1998, 249-250), but it was only mentioned as a possibility in the Agreement, and instead the GFA established a civic forum for the
North alone (and it was subsequently marginalised partly because conventional politicians disliked it as ‘competition’).

16. Earlier still-born precedents in Ireland echoed the joint institutions designed to hold together the separate parliaments of the Austro-Hungarian ‘dual monarchy’ in the 1870s.

17. The conflicts, like the populations involved, are now substantially urbanised, and are often most intense in cities partly because of dense populations living in close proximity. However, by the same token, and for the city to function as a city, the opportunities and the pressures for border crossings are all the greater. ‘Throwntogetherness’ in space (Massey 2005) may be greatest in cities, though whether it is always serendipitous is another matter.

18. For example, direct democracy based on non-territorial communities defined for instance by occupation or industrial sector as in trades unions or workers’ councils could be combined with deliberative democracy based on territorial and non-territorial groupings, and with territorial representation, in a ‘pyramid’ structure of smaller units building up to larger ones.

19. Protecting and reclaiming a sustainable ‘commons’ requires more cross-border democracy; but environmental problems and resource shortages could induce the richer and more powerful to ‘pull up the drawbridge’ and use state borders to exclude those less fortunate (see Johnston, Gismondi and Goodman 2006).
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