Shared Space in Belfast and the Limits of

A Shared Future

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Conflict in Cities and the Contested State: Everyday life and the possibilities for transformation in Belfast, Jerusalem and other divided cities


Divided Cities/Contested States Working Paper Series

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THE SERIES


Editorial note

This working paper relates to Research Module B1.2 ‘The Changing Built Environment and Socio-Economic Structures of Belfast’, and to Module B4 ‘From Conflict Management to Conflict Resolution’. As an aspect of our concern with the evolution of Belfast’s built environment since the 1960s and how it has interacted with ethno-national conflict, the paper presents some initial reflections on the kinds of questions involved in researching policies for ‘sharing space’, how the development of ‘shared space’ is being envisaged in Belfast, and the kind of sharedness that is understood and practiced through such efforts.

Biographical note

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Shared Space and the Limits of A Shared Future

Milena Komarova

Abstract

This paper offers some initial reflections on the kinds of questions involved in researching the development of policies for a ‘shared future’ in Northern Ireland and for ‘shared space’ in Belfast. It explores discourses on ‘good relations’ and communal identities, and it discusses their relationships to the task of defining, developing and practising the sharing of space in a ‘divided city’. It also suggests that Bourdieu’s notion of habitus might be useful in relating these discourses to the built environment and the meanings of space in everyday life.

Key words: shared space, community/good relations, identities, discourse, habitus

I. Introduction

Against the background of an obvious upsurge of regeneration efforts in Belfast, in an apparent attempt to turn the city into a spearhead of a new kind of ‘post-conflict’ urban living, a number of recent publications (both policy documents and academic research) have openly, or by implication, addressed questions like: How can urban space help forge public associations other than through ‘neutrality’? How can the notion of a more ‘integrated and shared society’ translate into specifically urban spatial expressions that both reflect an idea of a citizenry living together (and not apart), and themselves become instruments of it?

On the one hand, interrogating the role of public space in fostering interaction and cohesion across lines of ethnic and cultural diversity has in recent years been a UK-wide agenda which has generated a number of government and public agency reports (DEMOS, 2007; JRF, 2007), engaging with issues pertinent to, albeit not specifically focused on, the processes of peace-building in Northern Ireland (both at the level of public policy and at the level of communities). These reports emphasise the importance of public spaces as social resources (in successful regeneration policies and in creating sustainable communities); and they discuss the conditions for their workability (e.g., how well these spaces can be made to resonate with everyday life routines, and how well they accommodate wider definitions of community). Work like Amin’s (2002) on ‘ethnicity and the multicultural city’, while concentrating mostly on the importance of everyday urban life and the daily negotiation of ethnic difference, also draws attention to the significance of national and local political and policy frameworks within which the ‘micropolitics’ of everyday social contact and encounter is embedded.
On the other hand, in the context of Northern Ireland in particular, two recent reports - *Good Practice in Local Area Planning in the Context of Promoting Good Relations* (Bradley and Murtagh, 2007) and *Public Space for a Shared Belfast* (Gaffikin *et al*., 2008) provoke reflection about the intrinsic problems in defining and shaping public space as ‘shared’ and ‘civic’ in cities that have experienced prolonged ethno-national conflict – both in terms of policy approaches to, and the practice(s) of, sharing space among communities. Bradley and Murtagh (2007) express a concern with what is developing as a ‘dual speed’ city (the glossy, consumerist middle class Belfast that can afford to be above ethno-national divisions, and the more deprived working class Belfast territorialised in ethno-national terms and looking very much the same as it did ten or twenty years ago). They strongly suggest the need to implant ‘good relations’ (as in the government strategic document on ‘Good Relations in Northern Ireland’ (OFMDFM, 2005)) at the centre of a strategic and integrated governance approach to urban planning and regeneration in Belfast. In other words, the emphasis is on the need to translate the policy aspiration of forging an ‘integrated and shared society’ in Northern Ireland into shared urban space.

This paper offers some initial reflections on the kinds of questions involved in researching how shared space is being envisaged and created in Belfast - and indeed if it is being created – and what kind of sharedness is understood and practiced through such efforts. The notion of ‘shared space’ is but one aspect of the policy approaches needed to achieve some degree of sharing in Northern Ireland society, and it bears all the difficulties associated with defining what ‘shared’ means, and with coming to a common understanding of it. The paper explores the problematic nature of the concepts of ‘good relations’ and ‘sharedness’ and their link to different discourses on communal identities, as these are revealed in interviews with, and documents by, participants in the European Union Peace II Programme. It then asks what is the relationship between such discourses and the actual practice of sharing space at the level of everyday life. The discussion is first supplemented by a brief background to the wider social, political and policy context of Belfast and Northern Ireland: this serves to inform readers who will not be specifically acquainted with this context, and it highlights its significance as the framework within which the understanding and practice of sharing among communities is embedded.

II. Some background: political and policy context

- **Segregation and planning during the troubles**

One of the key characteristics of the social geography of Belfast (that became even more entrenched after the outbreak of ethno-national violence in 1969), is the contentious
spatialisation of identity, firmly linked to locality and its defence (Neill, 2005). Recent figures from the Belfast City Council indicate that ‘more than half of the city’s population now lives in wards that are either 90% Protestant or 90% Catholic community background’ (Belfast City Council Good Relations Plan, 2007). This residential segregation has created or is associated with a range of specific social, economic and planning problems such as distorted land and housing markets, blighted space, the duplication of many urban services, and multiple deprivation. Crucially, the perceived accessibility of all sorts of spaces (residential, recreational, and work) has been profoundly affected. The built environment has in some instances been altered through the building of ‘peacelines’ (brick walls, steel fences or other physical barriers marking the boundaries between different communities). Ironically though, for a place so notoriously ridden with sectarian division and conflict, as both Bollens (1999) and Neill (2005) comment local planning efforts since the 1960s have not been up to the task of addressing the ethnically divided nature of Belfast. Creating ‘enough civic space...for a shared city where difference is at least tolerated’ has remained a ground on which planners have ‘often fear[ed] to tread’ (Neill, 2005: 158).

With the introduction of ‘direct rule’ from Westminster in the early 1970s, planning, urban policy and housing in Northern Ireland were removed from local authority power and transferred to a new Department of the Environment for Northern Ireland (DoE NI) and to the Northern Ireland Housing Executive (NIHE). With this move conscious efforts were made to eliminate religious bias from the concerns of planning and to base it on objective and rational policy decisions. However, according to Bollens, (2000) this kind of ‘neutrality’ has in effect (re)produced inequality and has met little public appreciation. Throughout the 1980s attempts were made to ‘normalize’ Belfast and create in it a space for a different kind of interaction through a kind of urban regeneration applied primarily to the city centre and alongside the river Lagan. The approach gave considerable emphasis to retailing in the urban core. It has been criticised for its ultimately cosmetic nature which failed to deal at a deeper level with cultural identity (Neill, 2005: 193), and for its property-led bias which was unsuccessful in tackling other dimensions of urban deprivation in segregated working class neighbourhoods.

• **The changed political climate: the influence of the Good Friday Agreement**

The Good Friday Agreement (1998) recognised the political rights of both communities in Northern Ireland and provided for their expression in political institutions. The institutional arrangements it endorsed, included a Northern Irish Assembly with a power-sharing Executive (1). Crucially, the Agreement made major provisions on equality and human rights. In particular, and what is of direct relevance to the discussion here, Section 75 (a) of
The Northern Ireland Act (1998) set in place the provisions of the Agreement on equality by requiring that each public authority, in carrying out its functions relating to Northern Ireland, has due regard to the need of promoting equality of opportunity between individuals and groups from nine different categories (different religious beliefs; political opinions; racial groups; age; marital statuses; sexual orientations; gender generally; persons with and without disability; and persons with and without dependants). In addition to the above, Section 75 (b) stipulated that, without prejudice to these obligations, public authorities are also to have regard to the desirability of promoting *good relations* between persons of different religious belief, political opinion and racial group. What ‘good relations’ actually means is not further specified or interpreted by the Act itself.

Early analyses of the Good Friday Agreement tended to be very optimistic, seeing it as a new form of politics within Northern Ireland, based on pragmatism rather than ideology, with potentially positive consequences for the role of civil society organisations, and the articulation by them of a philosophy of post-nationalism and new citizenship (Cochrane, 2001). However in the light of subsequent developments, this optimistic prognosis was seen as problematic. The recurrent crises of devolution (e.g., over weapons decommissioning, policing reform, continuing British Army presence, flags and paramilitary activity) have resulted in the suspension of local devolved government on a number of occasions. Research has indicated that in the initial period after the signing of the Good Friday Agreement community relations stagnated (ARK Surveys Online, 1989 - 2005), leading some analysts to conclude that the level of communal division and polarisation had increased (e.g., Hughes, Donnelly, Robinson and Dowds, 2003). This has been accompanied by greater polarisation in voting behaviour and the emergence of the Ulster Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and Sinn Féin (SF) as the main representatives of their respective ethnic blocs (Tonge, 2006). This puts in question the more optimistic prognoses about the ability of the GFA to transcend Unionism and Nationalism (Cochrane, 2001). In addition, most conclude that the level of residential segregation has not decreased (e.g., NIHE, 1999; Shirlow and Murtagh, 2006); there were frequent incidents of interface violence in key areas in Belfast (and elsewhere); and the number of ‘peace walls’ in Belfast actually increased (Jarman, 2002; McVeigh and Rolston, 2007).

- **Policy engagement with segregation and territoriality in the new political dispensation**

One of the upshots of the Good Friday Agreement for the planning system in Northern Ireland has been the handing over to local devolved government of overall planning responsibility. That has now been split between the new Department of the Environment
(DoE) which has regulatory functions, (such as development control and development plans), the Department for Regional Development (DRD), responsible for regional planning and transport, and in addition the Department for Social Development (DSD) - with responsibility for regeneration. All this has led to the conclusion that currently “a complex and fragmented governance architecture operates across the different spatial scales of the city, highlighting the need for more effective multi-level governance arrangements” (McNeill and Wilson, 2008). Bradley and Murtagh (2007) also observe that the lack of clear policy integration horizontally, and an existing disjuncture between planning, urban policy and housing in the creation of shared space, make it difficult to see how desired outcomes can be delivered in practice. Furthermore, while the current regional development strategy (Shaping Our Future (DoE, 1997)) has (unlike previous plans for Belfast) sought ‘to confront the thorny issue of a deeply divided society’, the new Belfast Metropolitan Area Plan (the draft of which was published in 2004 - DoE), is said to contain virtually ‘no discussion at all of the cultural and physical segregation that scars and defines the region’ (McAlister, 2008).

To be sure, positive attempts to address the policy disjuncture have been made. In particular, Belfast City Council, as a part of its first Good Relations Plan (2007), has began attempting to generate a more collaborative and integrated approach to conflict transformation with the vision of developing ‘one’ city that is “shared, peaceful, welcoming and open”. These efforts can be seen both as an attempt to counteract the ‘dual track’ city, and also to focus efforts on the actual development and understanding of shared space as such. However, under the current public administration system the responsibilities of the Belfast City Council are very limited, and despite good intentions questions remain as to the extent to which the Council has been able to be a serious player in driving planning and regeneration policy for Belfast. Under the current review of public administration it is anticipated that responsibility for local planning will be transferred to local councils even though the Assembly will retain responsibility for regional strategic planning. It remains to be seen what effect that will have on the effectiveness of the planning system.

Thus planning efforts since the 1970s have not managed to transform the existing sectarian geography of Belfast and have at times, arguably even inadvertently helped to consolidate it. Broader policy efforts and the political agreement itself have so far also failed to effect any real transformation of the ethno-national divisions in society and politics. Against this background, any public policy advances in developing shared space in Belfast appear rather confined to the realm of ‘cultural imagineering’. The promotion of a consumerist lifestyle and the advertising of Belfast as a cosmopolitan centre may serve to attract tourists and inward investment but as Neill says ‘having an interest in the city as a shopper... is not the same as an emotional stake where one’s cultural identity is
acknowledged under the common umbrella of citizen’ (2005: 193). While there seems to be a unanimous political will driving efforts to cosmopolitanise the city, grounded in the culture of consumerism, there is the suspicion that consumerism and a booming tourist economy will result at best in neutral rather than shared space.

It was against this background that the government’s Good Relations Strategy, *A Shared Future (ASF)*, was published in 2005. It was the result of a commitment in the *Programme for [the Devolved] Government* (2001) to put together a cross-departmental strategy for the promotion of community relations. After the repeated dissolutions of the Assembly, the Strategy was eventually realised by the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister (OFMDFM) under direct rule. It was based on a formal review of existing community relations policies (which, among other things acknowledged the compromised nature of the term ‘community relations’ and recommended changing it to ‘good relations’) and on a public consultation exercise (whereby comments and suggestions on a draft consultation document were invited from all corners of society, and the replies received were subsequently published on a government website (2)).

### III. The Limits of *A Shared Future*

In this section I want to argue that part of the difficulty in giving practicality to the notion of shared space in Belfast emanates from its conceptual and discursive connections with the broader policy aim of developing good relations and a ‘shared future’ as expressed in this government document – an aspiration and idea that, in the context of Northern Ireland, has itself been mired in confusion. Conceptually, the question of the aim of a process of ‘micro’ peace-building in Northern Ireland is difficult to grapple with as it involves re-definitions of citizenship and identity. Discursively, different actors in society here have differing views as to what ‘shared’/’integrated’ means as a task for society/communities, who is to work for it, and how.

If the task of the *ASF* document should have been to address the question of ‘how can effective citizen participation be achieved in a society that is both socially differentiated and structured through political discourses that are openly antagonistic to pluralistic ideas of hybridity and diversity?’ (Graham and Nash, 2006: 255) then, as Graham and Nash have argued, the document has approached the task through a ‘constructive ambiguity’, attempting to be all things to all people and not to alienate the main political parties too much. Crucially, the Good Relations Strategy has been criticised for lacking any working definitions of key terms, such as sectarianism, racism, conflict, reconciliation, integration and
sharing, and has also been very vague on the definition of ‘good relations’. Ironically, a document that was meant to propagate a government vision of how to implant good relations in all government policies - a notion that in the Northern Ireland Act (1998) is directly linked to the achievement of equality, and that is meant to be at the heart of the task of creating a civil, democratic and non-sectarian society – is open to conflicting interpretations and the place of good relations in an overall process of peace-building is inadequately specified.

This policy weakness of *A Shared Future* arguably leaves room for exploitation of discourse for disparate political ends. Indeed, my previous doctoral research on discourses on peace-building in Northern Ireland, based on analysis of responses to the ASF public consultation exercise and on interviews with participants in the EU Peace II Programme (civil servants and non-government and elected politicians) (Komarova, 2007), found that there were different and often conflicting interpretations of the notion of ‘good relations’ and that these are discursively connected to different types of narrating communal identities. Exclusive territorialist understandings of ‘community’ and of the importance of ‘difference’ in developing relationships between communities (shared by representatives of the main political parties now in office in the new Executive and by many local communities), tend to militate against a more transformationist, civic discourse (Taylor, 2001) that is concerned to transform the conflict by challenging ethno-national assumptions.

### Publics: conceptual and discursive definitions

I want to highlight the fact that various identity discourses bear in divergent ways upon an understanding both of the conflict in Northern Ireland, and of ‘good relations’ as an aspect of building a shared society. By extension, I argue, such discourses also bear on the practical task of developing and participating in shared space. As Amin (2002) points out, the micro-politics of everyday encounter in public space is a question fundamentally related to the political culture of the public domain in which micro negotiations are necessarily embedded.

We can expand on this point by reference to some work on diversity recognition and deliberative democracy, situated in the discursive space opened up by public sphere theory (Gould, 1996; Fraser, 1997; Benhabib, 2002; Cooper, 2004). The debate here has revolved around conceptualising the relationship between various publics in a democratic public sphere, and around the conditions of conversing across lines of cultural and political differences, in order to come up with decisions about social problems, though not necessarily to transcend social conflict. Deliberative democracy theorists focus on dealing with difference and on the right to express it in the public sphere, on the constitutive role of power in producing social difference and identity, and on the value of diversity. A central issue in some of this work is that relationships between social groups are not just a matter of
recruiting the power of the state to regulate and address questions of (in)equality and rights, but a matter of direct negotiation between the various publics themselves (McBride, 2005). Two issues of analytical importance are closely related to this general stance: firstly, there should be a critical dialogue and reflection in the public sphere about the very identities of groups that promises to challenge the hidden logic of the categories of power and hierarchy associated with them (Benhabib, 2002); and, secondly, it is asserted that as a part of its task of dealing with difference the public sphere should be linked to the construction of some kind of collective identity (of citizenship - e.g., to the political interdependence between different collective identities - Mouffe, 1996).

Analysis of interviews and documents from my research suggests that in Northern Ireland there is a divergence of public discourses on these two issues. I find some of these discourses are problematic to the extent to which they refuse to see communal identities as potentially open to public scrutiny and examination, and refute the necessity of negotiation of relationships between the publics themselves, instead seeing peace-building as only a matter for legislation and state intervention. We can briefly examine examples of the discourses studied against the above points.

• **Collective identities in the public sphere and ‘good relations’**

McBride (2005) emphasises that culture and identity are inevitably embroiled in relationships of inequality and power; that the content of certain social identities is given by their hierarchical relationship to others; and that difference itself may be a product of inequality. Therefore, he suggests, ‘it is not simply the case that identities in a given society are constituted by their place within a system of differences but that these differences themselves are often hierarchical’ and ‘should not be taken as ‘givens’ but as candidates for moral scrutiny and potential revision’ (2005: 505). In short,

‘The normative content of social identities and the historical narratives which sustain them are proper objects of moral scrutiny and those who inhabit these identities can reasonably be held responsible for reflecting upon them and revising them accordingly’ (McBride, 2005: 506).

In an attempt to apply this argument to present-day Northern Ireland one could suggest that the task of building a shared future, a shared society, should involve, among other things, public acceptance of the possibility that collective identities can in principle be a subject of public scrutiny. Unsurprisingly perhaps, the analysis of interviews and documents, showed that by no means all were persuaded on this matter.
The *A Shared Future* (ASF) policy document on Good Relations is itself very vague on issues of identity and difference. It does make a commitment to a good relations framework in Northern Ireland that establishes

‘over time ...a normal, civic society, in which all individuals are considered as equals, where differences are resolved through dialogue in the public sphere and where all individuals are treated impartially. A society where there is equity, respect for diversity and recognition of our interdependence’ (2005: 10).

Yet, as the preceding discussion suggested, interpretations of what constitutes a normal civic society may vary and a generic agreement to resolve differences through dialogue in the public sphere on the basis of equality does not necessarily tell us much about how differences (and the related notions of identity) are understood and treated in terms of their contribution to the development of positive relationships between publics.

Indeed, analysis of the responses of the main political parties to the ASF consultation document, and especially the discourses of Sinn Fein (SF) and the Ulster Democratic Unionist Party (DUP)(3), shows that the notion of ‘good relations’ itself is not necessarily understood as including attempts at cultural and attitudinal change (involving re-examination of issues of identity and difference), but is rather confined to settling the question (crucial though it is) of equality and human rights in *legal and constitutional* terms or, (as in the case of the DUP), seen as a question of social redistribution.

Sinn Fein (SF) in particular keep away from any understanding of good relations going beyond compliance to Section 75 (a) of the Northern Ireland Act (1998) – the commitment to equality:

‘The fact that good relations cannot be allowed to take precedence over equality of opportunity lies at the heart of Section 75 of the NI Act 1998 … [G]ood community relations will flow from the achievement of equality and not the other way round’ (SF Response to ASF, 2003: 5).

Similarly, in a statement at the QUB *A Shared Future* Conference, Edwin Poots stated for the DUP:

“[C]ertainly if you want to have good community relations you have to have a confident community. In the Unionist community at this moment of time people feel discriminated against; they feel alienated,
marginalised and demonised. And there is absolutely no prospect of having good community relations in Northern Ireland while this continues to take place.”

And further on:

“[unionist] communities have not got their fair crack of the whip. Those communities have not got their fair share, whether it be in the allocation of peace monies, or the allocation of housing and a huge range of areas provided by the Government” (QUB, ASF Conference Report, 2004: 42).

Both the above quotes introduce ‘equality’ (albeit differently understood) as the principle measure for good relations, yet successfully avoid discussion of what community or good relations might mean in substance. One cannot disagree that ‘[e]quality and human rights threaten no one and benefits all’, and that ‘bringing about a more equal society can help tackle community division and bring about good relations’ (SF Response to ASF, 2003: 4). Indeed, as Harbison (2002) points out, the achievement of equality should be the sine qua non of any community/good relations policy. However, the implication in the above statements that good relations will naturally flow from the achievement of equality, i.e. that all dimensions of ‘good relations’ can be collapsed into the one task of achieving equality of opportunity (or redistribution of resources), is somewhat more problematic. First, as Amin suggests (2002), substantive equality is a question internal, not external, to cultural identities; and therefore, second, there needs to be another dimension of community/good relations, one that incorporates cultural and attitudinal change to difference and asks critical questions about aspects of collective identities in a way that contributes to the development of dialogical relationships between communities and individuals. The latter two points in fact express a position which some of the high profile voluntary organisations in Northern Ireland adopt in their responses to the ASF consultation. The Community Relations Council (CRC) and the Northern Ireland Community and Voluntary Association (NICVA) for instance warned against over-reliance on legislation and stated that the concepts of equality and human rights for all are directly related to the capacity to engage with improving relationships. They also argued that the focus now should be on building on the equality gains already made through mechanisms such as section 75, and ultimately define reconciliation as a project of ‘cultural growth and change’ (e.g., CRC Response to ASF, 2003: 13).

- **Identity and positive interdependence in a democratic society**
A brief discussion of narratives of collective identity is important here by way of examining and elaborating on the second assertion within a ‘pluralist and radical’ democratic view of publics which was mentioned above: that dealing with difference in the public sphere should be linked to the construction of some kind of collective identity, or to the recognition of the political interdependence between different collective identities. Mouffe in particular sees this approach as opposed to a conception of democratic politics ‘exclusively in terms of a struggle of a multiplicity of interest groups, or of minorities for the assertion of their rights’ (1996: 274); a conception which remains blind to the relations of power.

Initially, the analysis of interviews and documents in my PhD research (Komarova, 2007) did not have the purpose of exploring narratives of collective identity (4). Nevertheless, it had to recognise that such narratives were occupying a central position in the discourses of many participants. Notions of collective identity and of difference were embedded in the discursive use of the words ‘community’, ‘culture’ and ‘tradition’, or were simply seen in participants’ narration of common experience. ‘Community’ in particular seemed to be a Northern Irish colloquialism acting not just as a form of narrative representation of particular collective entities, but also having an ontological status – a way or a basic node of existence in Northern Irish society. As the analysis of both interviews and documents highlighted, various notions of collective identity eventually bear on interpretations of peace-building.

- **Narrating collective identity: essentialist repertoires**

  The analysis demonstrated that narratives of collective identity/community tend to imply either an essentialist or a contingent, (or sometimes a mixture of the two), view of collective identity. The essentialist (or categorical) view of collective identity presumes internally stable concepts, and is tempted to conflate identities with pre-fixed, singular categories, (such as ‘Protestant’ or ‘Catholic’) and ‘community’ with ‘single-identity’ (whereby the former becomes a misnomer for the latter). Some of the consequences of the categorical or essentialist approach to narrating identity for a view of peace-building are that changes in particular identities are interpreted as losing one’s identity altogether. This seems to bear in some cases on a perception of the paramount importance of ‘single-identity work’ (5) (based around the necessity to build up one’s own culture and collective confidence) as an approach to community relations. Here, however, looking at one’s own identity is not understood as problematising this identity, or as working out alternative conceptions of it, but is seen instead as a necessary prerequisite for an engagement with or even a contest against another identity. At the very least, narratives employing an essentialist understanding of identities don’t tend to leave much space for an effective dialogue that can transcend a traditional zero-sum conflict between sectarian communities. An example of
such an approach is found in the following extract from an interview with a community worker from Belfast. In it the interviewee defines what in her opinion is the major manifestation, or example, of conflict in Northern Ireland today:

“Right - I feel just over the years the Nationalist community have stuck to their guns type of thing – in more ways than one, you know what I mean... And I think there never was any agenda in the Protestant community... I think the difference is that people on the Protestant side are seeing that violence pays. ... I think, well, this is what I feel – people are saying to me in [this part of] Belfast that they feel withering down of their culture and whatever identity they did have. They didn't have much to begin with. But what there is, is gone nearly. Like, the RUC and bits and pieces like that, you know, the RIR, you know – everything is gone for them, they are not allowed to have the Queen now in police stations and all that – those wee things that they would identify with: the flag at Stormont, you know, simple things. That's what I hear. And those are all only tangible things really but, you know, if you’re feeling low yourself in having confidence, stripping all that stuff off isn't gonna help, you know.”

In the extract above the participant defines conflict in Northern Ireland specifically as being about the right of the Protestant community to express their identity through public institutions. Since in the case of the ‘Protestant community’, on behalf of which the participant speaks, there is said to be a traditional understanding of public institutions as an embodiment, or an expression of a ‘Protestant people’, a move to reform public institutions along lines neutral with respect to cultural identity is interpreted as an attempt to strip ‘the Protestant community’ of their identity. The above is undoubtedly a genuinely felt grievance, yet an assumption underlying this statement is that the expression of Protestant identity through public institutions is irrelevant to the constitution of hierarchical relationships between different cultural identities. In other words, it doesn’t recognise that public representation of a certain religious or cultural identity can be exclusionary to those who hold other identities because identities themselves can be woven around elements that manifest and celebrate hierarchical relationships.

Further examples of essentialist narrations of collective identity are found in interviews with DUP representatives that lack recognition that the democratization of relationships between communities requires of necessity an examination of the traditions implicated in them. Some
such interviews tended to prioritize in their discourses the importance of recognizing and respecting ‘difference’ over the question of how to build on difference while helping inter-communal relationships evolve in a democratic way. For example in this next extract the participant comments on the two alternatives, presented in the *A Shared Future* consultation document, between concentrating on managing the worst consequences of division, and promoting a more ‘integrated’ and ‘shared’ society:

“... managing difference makes it imply as though difference is wrong. Difference isn’t wrong. It’s how people deal with difference that is the issue. If we moved to a point at which people can accept others for where they are and what they are – don’t have to agree with them but if we move to the point where difference is accepted and respected then I think that that is the sort of society that we want. But I don’t believe that we can achieve a peaceful society by simply expecting everyone to abandon all that they’ve known and all that they believe and sort of become sandal-wearing-hug-everybody sort of people, you know.”

Notice the interpretation that the speaker chooses to give to the expression “managing difference”. To him it implies “that difference is wrong”. A different analysis of the consultation version of the *A Shared Future* document could point out that the expression is used there to create a contrast between two possible approaches to building a common future – *management of conflict and integration* – in other words the notional stress in the document, is put on ‘managing’ rather than on ‘difference’. However, by interpreting it as negating difference, the interviewee creates his own contrast between what is very positively termed “acceptance and respect for difference”, and what sounds almost as a little short of anarchy – abandoning everything that people “believe and ... becom[ing] sandal-wearing-hug-everybody sort of people”. In this fashion the interviewee misplaces the argument in the *A Shared Future* document which allows him to accentuate the importance of difference over the problem of how to build on difference in society in a way that still retains or creates positive relationships; or in a way that recognizes the interdependence between different identities.

Although Sinn Fein do not put a notional stress on ‘difference’ and ‘tradition’ in the same manner as some representatives of DUP do, in their response to the *ASF* consultation the party highlight an understanding of ‘neutrality’ or ‘parity of esteem’ as guiding principles of
the relationships between communities in Northern Ireland, and apply this understanding directly to the notion of ‘civic space’:

‘The use of civic space which is shared by people from different community backgrounds should be guided by the principle of cultural equality or neutrality. Parity of esteem as enshrined in the Good Friday Agreement has yet to be given effect in practical terms’ (Sinn Féin, 2003: 2).

Further on in their response, Sinn Fein describe the ASF consultation document as having ignored the findings of the Harbison Review that ‘homogenization’ (i.e., the attempt to create a single Northern Ireland identity) should be rejected. In this way SF create their own contrast: between neutrality and homogenization, out of which, predictably, neutrality comes out as a fairer and preferred option. The demand for acknowledging cultures as equal in this discourse is an argument for the legal affirmation of cultural differences that suggests a perception of cultures as homogenous wholes and, again, sidelines any need for a parallel process of working out inter-public relationships in society itself. Overall, one is left with the impression that in the essentialist discourse described above ‘good relations’ in Northern Ireland is defined as (to use the language of Amin) ‘a question of a struggle over rights and claims rather than as questions of civic identity or shared social values’ (2002: 967).

Furthermore, an essentialist understanding of culture/identity directly translates onto a spatial understanding of sharing as embodying the principle of neutrality. By contrast, one might want to argue that new shared space needs to be about creating the conditions that make the boundaries between identities more permeable; about leaving openings for identities to change and evolve, rather than serving as a stage for a simple appreciation and celebration of cultural identities and diversity. As Malik puts it,

‘The real question we need to ask ourselves is why we should value diversity. Diversity is important not in and of itself, but because it allows us to compare and contrast different values, beliefs and lifestyles, make judgment upon them, and decide which are better and which worse. It is important in other words, because it allows us to engage in political dialogue and debate, a process whereby different values are put to the test, and a collective language of citizenship emerges’ (2006: 14).

• **Narrating collective identity: contingent repertoires**

Unlike the previous examples, the narration of collective identity as contingent, which was found in most interviews with, and documents by, large voluntary organisations, is more
attuned to a communicative democratic view of the public sphere. It implicitly accepts that difference ‘is a problem for identity, not one of its adjectives’ (Hong: 1996) and implies that we should conceptualise power not as an issue, or a quality, external to identities but rather as constituting identities themselves. It therefore accepts, or at least recognises, the possibility that communal identities should remain in principle open for scrutiny and problematisation. The examples below of this kind of discourse draw on a scenario that doesn’t only accept or recognize difference but attempts to explore it in dialogue:

“... [W]e are trying to move the discussion towards not who-you-are or what-you-are but are you making significant contribution towards building positive relationships” (civil servant).

The written responses of large voluntary organizations to the ASF consultation attempt to articulate in an unambiguous manner the relationship between communal identities and ‘good relations’. The Community Foundation for Northern Ireland (CFNI) elaborate on the link between the right to assert one’s identity and creating a democratic context in society that recognises the limits of cultural and political expression:

‘The issues relating to protecting individual human rights and group rights, while promoting societal and group responsibilities, require more debate and understanding. There is also a need for a collective discussion about what aspects of the assertion of identity are an acceptable manifestation of cultural diversity and expression as opposed to being viewed as intimidating and unacceptable. This might relate to parades, festivals, marches or to the display of flags and emblems’ (Response to ASF, 2003: 3).

Further on it is stated:

‘The question must be asked “whether all aspects of culture and traditions automatically demand respect, encouragement and celebration. Possibly we need to engage in a collective and inclusive listing of potentially controversial traditions and then subject them to scrutiny. Such a challenge role might at the very least serve to develop a shared understanding about the raison d’etre for the tradition itself, and apprehensions concerning it’ (Ibid: 5).

The implication of the above analysis of narratives of collective identity is that we can see both the possible limitations of an essentialist approach, and the advantages of a contingent approach to social identities, as bearing upon how relating to others (as different) in the public sphere is conceived, and therefore also as bearing upon the quality and nature of
public deliberation over issues of sharing society and space. As Fairclough (2003) remarks, an effective public sphere debate should reasonably include an element of polemic but also elements of openness to and acceptance of difference; exploration of difference as in dialogue, as well as an attempt to resolve or overcome difference.

Unfortunately, the authors of the A Shared Future document itself treat the above themes in a vague and uncertain manner. Initially, in Part 1, ‘Policy and Strategic Framework for Good Relations in Northern Ireland’ a firm anti-essentialist view on identity is expressed through the following statement:

‘Multi-ethnic societies that work well teach us more specific lessons too. They recognise that the complex make-up of each individual is what gives us our unique ‘identity’ – rather than the latter being a blunt label attached to whole groups. And this identity is something that also evolves over time, as we go through life experiences and relate to others – not something unchanging which seals us off from those who are ‘different’ (ASF, 2005: 7).

In the above manner, a link is established between the importance of a contingent, open concept of identity and the possibility of developing democratic relationships between various publics in a society. Yet, at the same time, further on (in section 2.6.4) the document continues:

‘An individual or a community’s identity is evident, both internally and to ‘others’, by markers which are most frequently ‘cultural’ – that is as a result of learned behaviour or habits – and since conflict involves demonising or stereotyping others on the basis of these cultural identity markers, it follows that addressing diversity through culture is crucial to ‘promoting good relations’ (Ibid: 31).

In the above statement the specific meaning of the word ‘culture’, and the role of culture in addressing diversity is not unambiguous. If ‘culture’ is meant here as a reference to ‘significant cultural and attitudinal change’ (6), then one can unreservedly agree with the statement that addressing diversity through culture is crucial to promoting good relations. Yet, the reader is left uncertain as to how to interpret the meaning of the above, especially given the kind of non-deliberative argument based on the use of the conservative idioms of ‘culture’ and ‘tradition’ in, for instance, DUP discourse, or in the discourse of some local community organisations for whom engaging in ‘single-identity work’ (defined as learning about and being more ‘versed’ and ‘confident’ in one’s own culture) becomes a way of...
avoiding real engagement with others. Because in divided societies 'culture' becomes such an important marker of identity, (often in a territorialist sense), the use of the idiom of 'culture' in addressing conflict is problematic as there often is a tendency to interpret it uncritically. Therefore, it is crucial when a policy document such as A Shared Future uses the idiom of culture, that it makes a more rigorous attempt to tackle it systematically and unambiguously.

We can begin to see that in the above an opportunity is missed to clarify the link between 'developing relationships on an equal basis' and 'culture' and 'celebration of differences'. Unless the link between difference’s contribution to richness in society (where difference is related to a contingent understanding of identity), and the way inter-communal relationships are built, is specified all this remains a bit of a blank statement. Unfortunately the A Shared Future document is not specific enough on this issue. It dances around and hints at but it never quite articulates in detail the link between ‘identity’, ‘culture’, ‘celebrating differences’ and ‘good relations’ in a democratic society.

**IV. Does discourse matter for space?**

The discussion in the first part of this paper argued that the current policy framework has had little transformative impact on the existing sectarian geography of Belfast, and that the political agreement itself has been unable to effect any real transformation of the ethno-national divisions in society and politics. The latter statement was substantiated in the second part of the paper by an exploration of the discourses on community/good relations and communal identities which emphasised that both society and politics in Northern Ireland are still to a large extent structured through essentialist discourses of communal identities, shared among some community representatives and politicians from the main political parties now in office. The premise has been that these discourses seriously influence the more particular task of developing shared urban space and the practice of participating in it - a premise that now needs to be elaborated on. The question is, what relationship do wider political and civil society discourses on communal identities, community relations or ‘shared’ society bear to the actual development and practice(s) of shared (sharing) space? In the remaining part of the paper, I try to address this question.

On the one hand, the question draws attention to space as a social construct and to the need to pinpoint the mechanisms through which significance, meaning and identity become attached to space. Such a task involves both accounting for the link between broader
political discourses and policy frameworks and the discourses and practices of local communities in the process of socially constructing space, as well as accounting for how, through their discourses and spatial practices, local publics make ‘sense of place’ and relate to it in their everyday life; of understanding what ‘shared’ means to the people who inhabit this space and how it can be arrived at from an everyday life perspective. On the other hand, bearing in mind the task of developing shared civic space in Belfast, the issue is how does the discursive construction of space relate to spatial practices and to the materiality of physical space (the built environment of the city) to produce civic outcomes?

**Habitus and space**

In looking for a conceptual framework to help us account for the link between broader social and political discourses, policy frameworks and the locally produced meaning of space in everyday life we might find Bourdeu’s notion of *habitus* useful. The notion introduces a relational dimension between culture, social structure and action, showing how actors reproduce the social order but also rework and contest it. Furthermore, *habitus* has already been used to help explain processes of place-making in fields relating to the practices of the built environment (Hillier and Rooksby, 2001) and such existing work can be put to use in this research.

Bourdieu defines *habitus* as ‘a system of durable, transposable dispositions… predisposed to functions as… principles which generate and organise practices and representations’ (1990: 53). Hillier and Rooksby observe that ‘[h]abitus is thus a sense of one’s (and others’) place and role in the world of one’s lived environment’ and that it is ‘an embodied, as well as a cognitive, sense of place’ (2002: 5). The same authors point out that Bourdieu’s view of the precise nature of physical space is difficult to discern and perhaps the most that can be said is that in this view social space translates into physical space though the transition is often blurred. Nevertheless, Bourdieu’s notion of habitus (as the set of dispositions to act in a certain field, the feel for, or the practical sense for ‘the game’) helps demonstrate that there is a dialectical relationship between the politics and culture of a democratic public sphere, the practices of governance, of everyday life, and the constitution of physical space.

But if space is contextualised through discourses and practices inscribed around certain places, so also are communal identities. Neither collective identities nor space can be abstracted from social and ‘power relations, language, culture and the whole set of practices that make agency possible’ (Mouffe, 2002: 98) as they are all parts of a democratic habitus. An understanding of collective identity and of how relationships between publics need to be constituted is embedded in the meaning and use of space at the level of everyday life, and
influences the degree and effectiveness with which everyday spaces can function as sites of ‘cultural transgressions’ (7). In this sense, the contentious spatialisation of identity in Belfast (the link of identity to locality and its defence) is in part the spatial expression of the territorialism of identity itself (as discussed previously) and demonstrates the lack of an active public sphere and the social capacity that grows from it. Breaking the gridlock between identity and territory then is partly a matter of developing a more open-ended and contingent notion of collective identity itself.

• **Narrating and performing identity and space**

In exploring the relationship between identity and the built environment Leach (2002) reminds us of the discursive link between identity and space. Identity is never abstractly narrated but always contextualised and inscribed around certain objects; and the other way round - the built environment (like other objects) is embedded in and given meaning by various cultural discourses through which people make sense of place. Still, beyond discourse, Leach points out that habitus presupposes an interaction between social behaviour and a given objectified condition i.e. that praxis unlocks the meaning of objects. He then goes on to explore how a sense of belonging is achieved through practices (‘performativities’: identity as being acted out), which to him suggests ‘a way in which communities might colonise various territories through the literal ‘performances’ – the actions, ritualistic behaviour and so on...’ (2002: 285). In other words, practices of group identity manufacture cultural and historical belongings. Belonging to a place can then be understood as an aspect of territorialisation, out of which a sense of identity is forged. Performativity itself is seen as both repetitive and citational by nature and at the same time as having the power to question and subvert that which it cites. The emplaced performativity of identity then could be seen not only as re-enacting an existing scenario but as offering an obvious mode of challenging existing structures. The following example from an interview with a community worker from a local community organisation in Belfast for instance shows that engaging in community development activities through local community structures offers a way towards a more flexible understanding and practice of collective identities in a way that contributes to learning how to live with difference even within the confines of communal or ‘ethnic’ space:

“In single-identity [context] we are actually working on a thing at the minute called challenging perceptions and we would maybe put together four thematic workshops around say parading, policing, sectarianism, I’d say, and community leadership. And these workshops will be focused on trying to tease out our own maybe sorta cemented perceptions of another culture. ... For instance, last
year we had [this person] from the Grand Lodge to come in to maybe dispel some of them myths associated with that. And I found it to be a brilliant exercise because people had this picture painted in their head about what the Orange Lodge was. I’m not telling you that the Orange Lodge is a good thing now but at least it broke down some of the stuff that was there. ... So, with the workshops we were sorta saying, “Say, if we allowed all that, say if we took away the Blue Band parade and put away paramilitary flags, what is it you oppose?” And people are sorta going, “No, I just don’t like them anyway.” And you’re going “But why?” So, that’s the sort of stuff we were trying to involve primarily younger people because younger people can be the most reactionary on the road."

Another example of local spatial practices is the work of local community organisations and workers in managing controversial events (parades, riots). This can be seen as creating a working regulatory practice for the use of space that perhaps gradually influences the content of the events themselves. These processes of interaction remain largely hidden from the public eye and though they are often commented on and registered in research, their very dynamic has not been overly researched. It remains to be explored whether examples like the above can and do lead to a different kind of identification with space (8).

- **The materiality of space**

  While the above discussion focused mostly on aspects of the social construction of space and the link between identity and space through discourse and practice, Amin (2008) draws attention to the role of the materiality of space itself. He develops a ‘post-humanist’ account of urban public space that tries to break with the long tradition locating the culture and politics of public space in the quality of inter-personal relations. Amin is adamant that he does not wish to dissent from the view that the character of public space and that of public life are closely connected, yet nevertheless stresses that social interaction itself is circumspect and rarely involves transgressing long-accumulated attitudes and practices towards the stranger; and that the sociology of public gatherings cannot be read as a politics of the public realm. Instead, he locates the promise contained in the working of urban public space ‘in the entanglement between people and the material and visual culture of public space’ and emphasises that the link between public space and public culture should be traced to the ‘total dynamic – human and non-human – of a public setting’ (Amin, 2008: 8). The recognition of others in this view is the response to the condition of such a ‘situated multiplicity, the thrown-togetherness of bodies, mass and matter, and of the many uses and
needs in a shared physical space’. It is the result of a ‘habit of unconscious reflex’, a reflex of ‘trust in a situation’. Of course, Amin stipulates, the situation itself is not solely shaped by the material dynamics of individual public spaces, but by their historical legacies, and by the way individual public spaces are included in a broader spatial ordering and arrangements that need to be non-hierarchical. Finally, Amin closes the circle of conditions to be met if public space is to produce civic outcomes, by relating these back to the state and the public sphere. He stresses that guarantees are needed from the state without which interventions in public space will amount to no more than ‘tinkering on the edges’:

‘The social capacity that grows from an active public sphere – nourished by state-protected welfare, high quality public services, a vibrant public culture, and public spaces for the many and not the few – cannot be left to fortune, now so intoxicated by the excesses of the market’ (2008: 23).

The above view of Amin is to a degree reminiscent of Bourdieu’s notion of habitus and can arguably be read as habitus reworked to include in a more apparent and conscious way the materiality of space itself. Still, there remains the question of how to study this materiality; of how to address the material irreducibility and specificity of public space. In this respect Wells (2007) offers a framework for analysing things in the city that does not simply reduce them to language by loosely following Lefebvre’s triadic theorisation of space. She uses Lefebvre’s ‘representations of space’ to bring attention to how governments materialise their rule in the organisation and surveillance of urban space through, for instance, the erection of monuments and memorials and through town planning which combines the material and the visual and has the capacity to render a vision concrete in the built environment. Wells then utilises Lefebvre’s notion of ‘spatial practices’ to consider the role of capital in shaping the material culture of the city through demolition and reconstruction of urban neighbourhoods and spaces of consumption. She suggests the role of capital needs to be researched and understood not only through its pure visibility (the glitter of spectacle), class and social inequality but also by attending to objects and the relationship between objects and people (asking how objects are produced, arranged and circulated and how their production, arrangements and circulation shapes the practices of people; questioning how things came to be in a certain place and why they remain there); and, lastly, by researching how government and capital can be powerful determinants of the materiality of the city. Lefebvre’s third typology of ‘representational spaces’ is used to discuss how the material culture of everyday practices produces the symbolic differentiation of space, and how the materiality of the city is also made from below – both through the material culture of consumption and through spectacular moments and events.
The discussion in this section can be seen as informing a research framework that aims to assess recent developments in the Belfast built environment from the point of view of how (if at all) they are contributing to the development of shared urban space and indeed what is the kind of sharedness that they are contributing to. It is suggested that Bourdieu’s notion of habitus might be helpful in addressing the relationships between political discourses, policy approaches to developing shared space (which should be extended to consider the role of capital), and the discourses and practices of communities inscribed around particular spaces and the materiality of these spaces. Case studies of the role and actual participation of various communities, public, private and non-government organisations, and institutions of government in plans and consultation processes for redevelopment and regeneration of particular areas in Belfast has the potential to demonstrate both an embodied and a cognitive sense of the place of oneself/one’s own group or community as well as that of others.

In the same way as there is a distinctive habitus of communities that affords them their own sense of place (in a democratic public sphere and in physical space/neighbourhoods) there is also a certain habitus of politicians, of government departments and local government that influences the way they relate to each other and (mis)recognise each others’ place in the politics of urban development. The link, or as the case might be – ‘the gap’ (following Hillier, (2002)) between political discourses, policy approaches to developing shared space and the practice of sharing space; between rational public policy, political will, and community participation, contains ‘hidden transcripts, of private and public deals, favours, cultural traditions, demagogic posturing’(Ibid: 165), an omnipotent fear of ‘the other’, mistrust among working class communities towards the middle class, government departments (civil servants) and even large voluntary organisations, seen as powerful and unfair others. None of these, Hillier says, are picked up by traditional theories of planning policy and decision-making, nor by recent theoretical advances in deliberative democracy, consensus-building and agonism which often assume that a deliberatively reached recommendation equals the final outcome.

V. Conclusion

To contribute to an existing discussion about the need to implant ‘good relations’ at the centre of a strategic and integrated approach to urban planning in Belfast, this paper has attempted to establish that the contested meaning of ‘good relations’ among various groups in Northern Ireland, and their essentialist discourses on communal identities, have an important bearing on the development and use of shared space in an urban context. It
argued that part of the difficulty in giving practicality to the notion of shared space in Belfast emanates from its conceptual and discursive connections with the broader policy aim of developing good relations and a ‘shared future’ as expressed in the government strategic policy on Good Relations (OFMDFM, 2005) – an aspiration that, in the context of Northern Ireland, has been mired in confusion. The paper then suggested that Bourdieu’s notion of *habitus* might be useful in researching recent developments in the Belfast built environment from the point of view of how (if at all) they are contributing to the development of shared urban space, and indeed what is the kind of sharedness to which they might be contributing.

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**Notes**

1. The creation of a North-South Ministerial Council and a British-Irish Council bring together, respectively, government ministers from the Irish Republic and from Northern Ireland, and representatives from all parts of Ireland and Britain. The Agreement also stipulated the decommissioning of weapons, the release of paramilitary prisoners, and an inquiry into policing in Northern Ireland.

2. [www.asharedfutureni.gov.uk](http://www.asharedfutureni.gov.uk)

3. Unlike all other main political parties in Northern Ireland, the DUP have not got a response to the *ASF* document published on the government website listed above. Contacts with their press office did not establish much beyond that. I was told the DUP’s response to *ASF* should be on the website, and when I pointed to the contrary no other suggestions were made as to where I could get it. Indeed, Graham and Nash (2005) state that the DUP have not issued such a response and consider this fact telling about the party’s whole attitude towards the ‘shared future’ agenda. At the same time I encountered a working paper published by QUB’s Institute of Governance that contains the speeches delivered at a conference for the launch of the *ASF* document in 2004 (Hinds, B. (ed.) A Shared Future: Written Report. Working paper QU/GOV/1/2004. Belfast: QUB. http://www.governance.qub.ac.uk/schools/SchoolofLaw/Research/instituteofGovernance/Publications/briefingpapers/Filetoupload,47651.en.pdf. Comparison between the statements of all political parties made for that conference, and their responses to the *ASF* consultation document revealed the two were often identical, or as similar as to be almost identical. I have taken it therefore that the DUP statement contained in this working paper can be treated as a response to the *ASF* document in itself.

4. The thematic focus of interviews was mostly on Priority 2 of the Peace II Programme: *Social Integration, Inclusion and Reconciliation*. The interview schedule varied slightly depending on the
categories of organisation/body represented by different participants: whether or not it had been an implementing/intermediary funding body under the EU Peace II Programme, and if so differences in the order and topics of conversation arose depending on the specific measure of Peace II that the respective institution had been overseeing. Such differences notwithstanding, in all cases the interview schedules covered three general areas of inquiry: the experience of the respective organisation with the Peace II Programme; Community/Good Relations as an approach to peace-building; and views on major causes and manifestations of division and conflict in Northern Ireland at present.

5. One model of community relations work that has developed in Northern Ireland, (and that has been widely used within the European Peace Programmes), is so called ‘single-identity work’. Single-identity work is a rather overarching concept that can encompass a variety of project-types and initiatives, ranging from ‘own culture validation’ to ‘respect for diversity’ work (Hughes and Donnelly, 1998).

6. One of the five strands of the definition of reconciliation proposed by Hamber and Kelly (2005).

7. The term is used by Amin (2002) to denote a process of learning to be different through new kinds of cross-cultural interactions.

8. Leach (2002) suggests that identification with particular spaces is forged through a series of ‘mirrorings’ between people and the environment. Here the environment is seen to serve as a kind of a screen onto which people project their own meaning and at the same time into which they read themselves.

References


Belfast City Council (2007) Good Relations Plan. Belfast: Belfast City Council, Good Relations Unit.


