The Ottoman Years (1520-1918)
Tripoli was one of three major administrative districts (vilayets) during the early Ottoman period. It linked the entire coastal strip from Jubayl to Tartus and the provincial towns of Homs and Hama in the Syrian hinterland (Gulick, 1967 p. 18). Centuries of trade, intermarriage, labour migration and landholdings had established intimate links and connections among the people of the region. The French take over of the region in 1918 severely disrupted this complex web of social, cultural and political relationships.

European incursions and French Colonial rule (1918-1943)
Tripoli had been subjected to European influence since the 17th century, when French and Italian merchants competed for access and control over its silk exports (Gulick, p. 18 -19).When the League of Nations assigned France the official political mandate over what is today Lebanon and Syria in 1920, foreign domination was institutionalized and sanctioned by the leading powers of the post Ottoman world. Building upon earlier secret negotiations with Britain , France forcefully divided Tripoli from its historical surrounding to create the modern state of Lebanon (Traboulsi, 2007, pp. 75 – 80). The new state linked the predominantly Christian mountains to the Muslim populated cities of Tripoli, Beirut and Saida. This not only separated the city from its most vital economic base – the Syrian hinterland – but radically reversed the balance of power between the different confessional groups. Sunni Muslims had always made up the majority in the Ottoman Empire. Greater Lebanon reversed this social order in favour of the Christian population, who now exceeded the number of Muslims by a small majority (Traboulsi, 2007, p. 86).

Tripoli responded with violent resistance against the forced partition of the region (Traboulsi, 2007, p. 78). Local politicians organised successive waves of protests, strikes and boycotts demanding the reunification with Syria and the end of French rule. Popular anger was by no means exclusive to the Muslim population but reached across confessional divides (Trabousli, 2007, p. 81; see also Thompson, 2000). Abdu Hamid Karami, mufti and head of one of the most powerful political families in Lebanon was one of the leading figures of the reunification movement (Gulick, 1967, p. 34; Traboulsi, 2007, p.101). His call for organised resistance in the 1920 and 30ties laid the foundation for Tripoli’s ambivalent relationship to the Lebanese state. Anti statist attitudes and movements continued to re-emerge in ever new configurations ever since Lebanon gained independence in 1943. The name Karame would remain closely related to the insurgent potential of the city. Abdu Hamid’s son, Rachid Karami, 8 time prime minister and key figure of Tripoli’s political establishment, headed one of the most severe insurrections against the central government in Beirut in the 1950s, that brought the country close to civil war (Traboulsi, 2007, p. 133 -137, Gulick, 1967, p. ix)

3. Internal structuring of the City

Tripoli is the second largest city in the North of Lebanon. It has long been a major port in the Levant facilitating the intensive trade in silk, oil and other raw material with Syria, Iraq, Kuwait and Europe. The civil war (1975 – 1991) severely disrupted the prospering urban economy and sent the city on a downward spiral from which is never recovered ever since.

The present structure of Tripoli dates back to 1289, when the city was conquered by the Mamluks (1289 – 1516). In fear of European crusaders the Mamluks abandoned the ancient centre around the harbour – al Mina - and rebuilt the entire city from scratch, 2 km away from the shore (Weber, 2007, p. 77). The key concerns reflected in the physical layout of the new Mamluk city were defence and protection from foreign invaders. Markets and streets were organised in an irregular, zigzag fashion to confuse and confine unwanted intruders and turn the city into a trap. Each quarter could be closed off by its own gates and had tall stone houses built at strategic corners. In them armed guards could overlook the entire city and its surroundings and fire warning shots if need be, through tiny slit windows (Doughty, 2000). Newly built areas constructed after the arrival of the French lack the enigmatic and mysterious features of the ‘Old city’. Urban planning in the Mandate era put an end to the chaotic structure of the Mamluk period and replaced it with a modernist planning rational. The modern parts of the city stretching from the medieval centre down to the Mina region follow a Haussman type model of grand boulevards, roundabouts and open spaces that allowed for of maximum surveillance and control . The population today is estimated at about 500.000 people, the majority of whom are Sunni Muslims. Precise numbers are missing because political considerations prevented an official census ever since 1932 . Back then the city counted 54.000 officially registered residents, 38.500 of whom were Sunni Muslims, 10.000 Christians, 24 Jews and about 22 Alawites (Gulick, 1967, p. 31).

The Alawites are a small sect within Shia Islam. Syria is one of the few countries led by an Alawite regime, currently headed by Bashar al-Assad. In Tripoli, Alawites constitute a minority of about 50.000 people. Yet their strong links to Syria established them as powerful factor and force. The Alawite population concentrates predominantly in the densely populated district of Jabal Mohsen. Situated on top of a hill they overlook the Sunni quarter of Beb Tebbaneh, home to about 100.000 working class families. The two communities share a long and ongoing history of violent confrontations that dates back all the way to the civil war (1975 – 1991).

Situated on the Eastern outskirts of Tripoli Beb Tebbaneh and Jabal Mohsen are physically separated from the rest of the city by the river Abu Ali. Years of strategic neglect and abandonment have turned this natural rift into an almost insurmountable social barrier. While Beb Tebbaneh and Jabal Mohsen remained deeply impoverished and underdeveloped, deprived of any form of urban governance and planning, the shopping district of Azmi and the marina of al Mina on the other side of the river display a moderate appreciation for Western style cosmopolitanism and urban lifestyles pointing to the presence of a small but influential middle class.

The social and cultural divisions that run through the city are further reflected in the language used to demarcate places, territories and relationship in the city. Trips from Tebbaneh or Jabal Mohsen to the grand Souk or Al Tal in the historical centre are described as ‘…going to Tripoli…’, almost as if going to a different town. People do not feel part of the city and have simply erased large parts of it from their social and mental map .

4.  Recent/contemporary nature and stage of the ethno-national conflict.

The past 5 years have seen a new wave of clashes and armed confrontations in the city. None of these conflicts are of the city, however. They rather reflect Tripoli’s role as key strategic site in the wider crisis of the Middle East. The city is home to 2 Palestinian refugee camps that received tremendous support and solidarity from politicians and the population up until the civil war in 1975. During the late 1960s and 1970s, at the height of the Pan Arab movement, Lebanon granted Palestinians the right to carry out armed confrontations from its territory and gave them de facto sovereign control over the camps. Christian politicians strongly resented this decision, while leftist groups and social revolutionaries actively supported Palestinians in their fight. Hundreds of young men from Beb Tebbaneh joined Palestinian militias, putting the neighbourhood right at the heart of the Arab/Israeli war (Seurat, 1986). Ironically, it was this regional escalation of an inner Lebanese conflict that pitted Beb Tebbaneh against its immediate neighbours, the Alawite community. Jabal Mohsen had sought protection from Syria, against the strong alliance between the Sunnis from Tebbaneh and the PLO.

In the summer of 2007 the camps draged the city into another bloody war. This time it was a radical jihadist group, Fatah al Islam that started a fierce battle with the Lebanese army inside the Nahr el Bared refugee settlement. Only 1 or2 member of Fatah al Islam were Palestinian. The majority of fighters came from Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Syria, and other Arab states. Their key goal was to join the Iraqi insurgence in its fight against America. It remains unclear what sparked the armed confrontation. What is evident is, that neither the Lebanese government nor the Palestinians were in control of events. As the sociologists Sari Hanafi (2007) and Bernhard Rogier (22007) pointed out, some of the camps have turned into semi/autonomous enclaves that operate outside any ones jurisdiction. Yet, in this regard, they are no different from other parts of Tripoli. Beb Tebbaneh, in fact, has always been closer engaged with the camps of Baddawi and Nahr el Bared then with the rest of the Northern capital.

Sustained periods of violent unrest and social upheaval in the 1960s and 1970s have established a wide spread perception of the Tebbaneh as home of the ‘dangerous classes’. The Lebanese army and security forces considered the quarter as a no-go area. The myth of inviolability soon turned into a source of collective pride and sense of purpose and gave rise to a new urban separatist movement among local groups (Seurat, 1986). Harakat al Tawhid – a network of militant Sunni Islamist groups - was one of the key promoters of this new utopia project that tried to turn Tripoli into an autonomous city-state. Between 1983 and 1985, in the midst of the civil war, the group managed to established Islamic rule throughout the city. Yet their short lived experiment with urban theocracy soon found a brutal and uncompromising end at the hands of a Syrian led coalition of Alawite, Communist, Baathist and Syrian Nationalist forces that carried out a series of bloody massacres, among leading figures of the Tawhid movement and its associates (Hanf, p. 306). Between 500 and 1000 people died, mostly men from Beb Tebbaneh (el-Cheikh, 2008; Ghaddar, 2008; Muir, 1985). More than 250.000 decided to flee (Hanf, 1994, p.306) The traumatic events left a whole generation of war orphans behind (el-Cheikh, 2008).

The two communities never made peace with each, but rather continue to engage in armed confrontations up until today. ‘We don’t make peace here’, one resident explains. ‘We only have prolonged periods of ceasefire. ’ Yet clashes never revolve around ideological or personal differences. People and territories are attacked for their significance and role as instrument and mercenaries of political rivals and /or enemy regimes. The open wounds left behind by the war make it easy to mobilize people alongside these lines.

5.  Prospects/expectations/scenarios for the future

There is little indication for substantive change in Tripoli, despite the severity of the political and social crisis of the past years. The dense concentration of old and new self appointed defence and liberation movements – both in the city and the surrounding refugee camps - sustains a highly volatile situation that can easily explode if the political tensions on the national level are not resolved. The upcoming elections are rather prone to increase tensions between political rivals and opponents, that can all too easily lead up to another proxy war in which pro and anti government forces and their respective regional allies use Tripoli as cheap battleground to settle scores.

References:

Abdel-Latif, O. (2008). Lebanon's Sunni Islamists - A Growing Force. Beirut: Carnegie Middle East Center.

Doughty, D. (2000). Tripoli. Lebanon’s Mamluk Monument. Saudi Aramco World, 51(3), 2-15. Retrieved from http://www.saudiaramcoworld.com/issue/200003/tripoli-lebanon.s.mamluk.monument.htm

El Cheikh, B. (2008). Bab al Tebbanah's lost Youth Retrieved July 10th, 2008, from http://www.arij.net/look/english/details.tpl?IdLanguage=1&IdPublication=2&NrArticle=146&NrIssue=3&NrSection=2